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ABSTRACT
The School of Graduate Studies
The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

College/Department: Engineering/Electrical and
Computer Engineering
Name of Candidate: Elbasher O Esalmi Elmahdi
Title: Secure Data Integrity in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

Wireless ad hoc networks (WANETs) have become increasingly popular in our everyday
business and personal lives. As long as nodes in the network belong to the same
organization and share the same goal, it can generally be expected that all nodes can be
trusted. So, without any security measures in place, any node is capable of compromising
the integrity of the data it forwards. It is necessary to save or secure data transmission in
WANETs to achieve effective communication because most of the routing protocols
proposed for WANETs assume a trusted and reliable environment and they do not consider
the security issues in their initial designs. The security aspects concern the methods to
protect the information and to guarantee authentic transmissions. The security problems
are well known, and many studies have been done in this area.
Data integrity is an important security challenge in WANETs and one of the main
security requirements in WANETs. Data integrity is required to support that message has
not been corrupted, altered, or changed during the transmission of the data.
This dissertation proposes three schemes to protect data integrity in different
environments of the WANETs. First, it proposes a method protecting data integrity for a
multi-application environment in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) that use the
iv

Concealed Data Aggregation Scheme for Multiple Applications (CDAMA) in the presence
of end-to-end confidentiality by homomorphic encryption. For this method, we integrate a
technique using message authentication code (MAC) protocol into the CDAMA scheme to
detect and drop false data sooner for protecting data integrity and to overcome any bogus
data in the network early. Second, it proposes a new approach to provide reliable and secure
data transmission (data integrity) in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) under possible
blackhole attacks based on modified Ad-hoc On-demand Multipath Distance Vector
(AOMDV) protocol using homomorphic encryption scheme for cryptography technique.
Third, it proposes a technique integrated into Compressive Sensing-Data Compression
(CS-DC) scheme to detect and drop any malicious data quickly for protecting data integrity
in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) when data is forwarded from vehicles to Road
Side Unit (RSU) for avoiding RSU deception. The performance of the proposed schemes
shows the capability of protecting data integrity and the improvement of data transmission
in the presence of malicious nodes in WANETs.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Overview of Wireless Technology

Wireless technologies, in the simplest sense, enable one or more devices to
communicate without physical connections, without requiring network or peripheral
cabling. Wireless technologies use radio frequency transmissions as the means for
transmitting data, whereas wired technologies use cables [1]. Wireless technologies range
from complex systems, such as Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) and cellphones
to simple devices such as wireless headphones, microphones, and other devices that do not
process or store information. A brief overview of wireless networks, standards, and security
issues is presented in this chapter.
1.2 Wireless Networks

Wireless networks serve as the transport mechanism between devices and among
devices and the traditional wired networks (enterprise networks and the Internet). Wireless
networks are categorized into three groups based on their coverage range: Wide Area
Networks (WWANs), WLANs, and Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs).
WWANs include wide coverage area technologies such as 2G cellular, Cellular Digital
Packet Data (CDPD), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), and Mobitex.
WLANs, representing wireless local area networks, include 802.11, HiperLAN, and
1

several others. WPANs represent wireless personal area network technologies such as
Bluetooth and IR. All of these technologies receive and transmit information using
electromagnetic (EM) waves [2].
1.2.1

Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs)
Internet devices are located within a relatively small area, that is, generally within

a person’s reach. For example, both Bluetooth radio and invisible infrared light provide a
WPAN for interconnecting a headset to a laptop. Zigbee also supports WPAN applications.
Wi-Fi PANs are becoming commonplace as equipment designers start to integrate Wi-Fi
into a variety of consumer electronic devices. Intel “My Wi-Fi” and windows 7 “virtual
Wi-Fi” capabilities have made Wi-Fi PANs simpler and easier to set up and configure [3].
1.2.2

Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)
It links two or more devices over a short distance using a wireless distribution

method, usually providing a connection through an access point for Internet access. The
use of spread-spectrum or orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)
technologies may allow users to move around within a local coverage area, and remain
connected to the network. Products using the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standards are marketed
under the Wi-Fi brand name. Fixed wireless technology implements point-to-point links
between computers or networks at two distant locations, often using the dedicated
microwave or modulated laser light beams over a line of sight paths. It is often used in
cities to connect networks in two or more buildings without installing a wired link [4].

2

1.2.3

Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs)

They are types of wireless networks that connect several wireless LANs. WiMAX
wide area networks typically cover large areas, such as between neighboring towns and
cities, or cities and suburbs. These networks can be used to connect a branch office of the
business or as a public internet access system. The wireless connections between access
points are usually point-to-point microwave links using parabolic dishes on the GHz band,
rather than omnidirectional antennas used with smaller networks. A typical system contains
base station gateways and access points [5].
1.2.4

Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Wireless ad hoc networks are infrastructure-less networks, also known as wireless

mesh networks (WMNs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs). The network has no centralized access point, as we can see in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Wireless ad hoc network

3

It is a wireless network made up of radio nodes organized in a mesh topology. Each
node forwards messages on behalf of the other nodes and each node perform routing [6].
Ad hoc networks can “self–heal”, automatically re-routing around a node that lost power.
Various network layer protocols are needed to realize ad hoc mobile networks, such as
destination-sequenced distance vector routing, associativity-based routing, ad hoc ondemand distance vector routing, and dynamic source routing [7]. These networks are also
known as multi-hop networks because they do not require any fixed infrastructure. If a
source node wants to send some information to a destination node, the source node must
take the help of the intermediate nodes. Basically, the intermediate nodes act as the peer
nodes and these peer nodes take part in relaying the information from the source node to
the destination node. Thus, they are called multi-hop. If the destination node is not within
the direct transmission range of the source node, the source node will have to take help of
some intermediate nodes in order to send the data from the source node to the destination
node. Wireless ad hoc networks can be classified into different types as shown in Figure
1.2.

Figure 1.2 Classification of wireless ad hoc network
1.2.4.1 Wireless mesh networks (WMNs): It is the pure wireless ad hoc network where the
nodes are stationary, but they talk to one another in the ad hoc mode. In WMNs, nodes are
4

comprised of mesh routers and mesh clients. Each node operates not only as a host but also
as a router, forwarding packets on behalf of other nodes that may not be within direct
wireless transmission range of their destinations. A WMN is dynamically self-organized
and self-configured, with the nodes in the network automatically establishing and
maintaining mesh connectivity among themselves. This feature brings many advantages to
WMNs such slow up-front cost, easy network maintenance, strength, and reliable service
coverage [8].
1.2.4.2 Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs): Some or all nodes in the ad hoc networks are
mobile. Since the nodes are mobile, the network topology may change rapidly and
unpredictably over time. The network is decentralized, where all network activity including
discovering the nodes themselves must execute the topology and delivering messages, i.e.,
routing functionality will be incorporated into mobile nodes [9].
1.2.4.3 Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs): Using vehicles as mobile nodes is a
subclass of MANETs to provide communications among nearby vehicles and between
vehicles and nearby roadside equipment, but apparently, this network differs from other
networks by their characteristics. Specifically, the nodes (vehicles) in VANETs are limited
to road topology while moving [10].
1.2.4.4 Wireless sensor networks (WSNs): Here the sensor nodes connect each other in the
ad hoc mode. WSNs can be classified into two categories; one is the mobile category,
mobile sensor networks, and the other is the stationary category, wireless sensor networks
[11].

5

1.3 Wireless Standards
1.3.1 Introduction
Many standards for wireless communication are being developed day after day
and the price of their equipment becomes increasingly attractive. This will contribute to
the success of these technologies. In this section, we introduce the standards that are the
basis of many wireless networks.
1.3.2 WLAN: IEEE 802.11
The IEEE 802.11 standard describes the wireless area network characteristics. The
IEEE 802.11 can operate in two modes: infrastructure and ad-hoc. In the ad hoc mode or
infrastructure-less mode, two WLAN stations can communicate directly with each other
whenever they are in the same range spectrum without the intervention of an access point.
The set of all WLAN stations that can communicate with each other is called the basic
service set (BSS). A distribution system (DS) connects more than one BSS and forms an
extended service set. The concept of a DS is to increase network coverage through roaming
between cells.
1.3.3 WPAN: IEEE 802.15
The 802.15 WPAN efforts focus on the development of consensus standards for
personal area networks or short distance wireless networks. Initially, this standard was
developed in 1999 to enable communication over short distances. In this group, three
subgroups were initiated in parallel:
1. IEEE 802.15.1, the most well-known standard which is the basis of Bluetooth
technology.
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2. IEEE 802.15.3, which defined ultra-wideband (UWB) technology.
3. IEEE 802.15.4, the basis of Zigbee specification; this working group aimed to provide
a solution for WPAN with a low data rate also considering the power consumption issue.
1.3.4 WMAN: IEEE 802.16
Emerging technologies such as WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access), which is based on IEEE 802.16, are profoundly changing the
landscape of wireless broadband. This is due to the variety of fundamentally different
design options.
1.3.5 WMAN mobile: IEEE 802.20
IEEE 802.20 enables the worldwide deployment of affordable, ubiquitous,
always-on, and interoperable multi-vendor networks that meet the needs of business and
residential end-user markets. It supports various vehicular mobility classes up to 250
km/h in a Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) environment.
1.3.6 MIH: IEEE 802.21
IEEE 802.21 is an emerging IEEE standard. The standard supports algorithms
enabling seamless handover between networks of the same type as well as handover
between different network types, also called Media Independent Handover (MIH) or
vertical handover. The standard provides information to allow handing over to and from
cellular, GSM, GPRS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 802.11, and 802.16 networks through different
handover mechanisms.
1.3.7 WRAN: IEEE 802.22
In October 2004, IEEE set up a working group to develop the 802.22 standards for
WRANs. The standard specifies a cognitive air interface for fixed, point-to-multipoint,
7

wireless regional area networks that operate on unused channels. This standard is to cover
the rural and faraway region which has a small density of population and to provide
services which have the same efficiency as those provided by other broadband technologies
such as xDSL.
1.4 Security in Wireless Network
In wireless networks, the information is exchanged among authorized users, but
this process is vulnerable to various malicious threats owing to the broadcast nature of the
wireless medium. The security requirements of wireless networks are specified for the sake
of protecting the wireless transmissions against wireless attacks, such as eavesdropping
attack, DoS attack, data falsification attack, node compromise attack, and so on [12].
Generally, secure wireless communications should satisfy the requirements of authenticity,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability [13], as detailed below:

1.4.1 Authenticity: Authenticity refers to confirming the identity of a network node to
distinguish authorized users from unauthorized users. In wireless networks, a pair of
communicating nodes should first perform mutual authentication before establishing a
communication link for data transmission [14].
1.4.2 Confidentiality: Confidentiality refers to limiting the data access to intended users
only while preventing the disclosure of the information to unauthorized entities. Recently,
physical-layer security emerges as a means of protecting the confidentiality of wireless
transmission against eavesdropping attacks for achieving information-theoretic security
[15].
1.4.3 Integrity: The integrity of information transmitted in a wireless network should be
accurate and reliable during its entire life cycle representing the source information without
8

any falsification and modification by unauthorized users. The data integrity may be
violated by insider attacks, such as node compromise attacks [9]. More specifically, a
legitimate node that is altered and compromised by an adversary is called a compromised
node. The compromised node may inflict damage upon the data integrity by launching
malicious attacks, including message injection, false reporting, data modification, and so
on.

1.4.4 Availability: Availability implies that the authorized users are indeed capable of
accessing a wireless network anytime and anywhere upon request. The violation of
availability, referred to as denial of service, will result in the authorized users to become
unable to access the wireless network, which in turn results in unsatisfactory user
experience.
The above-mentioned authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and availability are
commonly considered and implemented in the existing wireless networks.

1.5 Dissertation Motivation and Contribution
The security of data transmission is a vital problem in communication networks. A
communication system is reliable if it provides a high level of security. Usually, users
exchange personal sensitive information or important documents. In this case,
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the exchanged data should be provided over
the transmission medium. Nowadays, a significant amount of data is exchanged every
second over internet multimedia, non-secured channel, which may not be safe. Therefore,
it is essential to protect the data from attackers in case of data transmission or forwarding,
which is the main focus of the dissertation, even when there is a secure routing protocol
9

which guarantees correct routes, misbehaving nodes as malicious nodes may cutoff packet
forwarding or even try to interfere with the network by modifying the packets they are
asked to forward. Therefore, to keep an acceptable level of performance, data transmission
mechanisms in wireless networks must be designed in a way to provide reliable and secure
data transmission under possible attacks.
The motivation of this dissertation is to provide a new mechanism method in the
wireless ad hoc network to provide data integrity protection, guarantee reliable and secure
data transmission in the presence of dropping or injection of packets by intermediate
malicious nodes. This mechanism prevents many misbehaviors and attacks such as
blackhole attack and false data injection attack [30].
The first contribution of this dissertation is the extension of the Concealed Data
Aggregation Scheme for Multiple Application (CDAMA) to detect any false data during
data forwarding or data aggregation process as early as possible to eliminate any false data
and improve the communication overhead in the network in multiple applications. We will
consider the security issue in the data aggregation and data forwarding of WSNs,
specifically, data integrity protection in CDAMA which prevents the altered aggregation
value from the compromised nodes to be aggregated or forwarded to the next node or base
station.
The second contribution is a proposed scheme based on Ad hoc On-demand
Multipath Distance Vector (AOMDV) protocol to provide secure data transmission in
MANETs against blackhole attacks using Enhanced Homomorphic cryptosystem (EHC).
The third contribution is integrating a technique into Compressive Sensing-Data
Compression (CS-DC) scheme which is the first scheme utilizes the compressive sensing
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theory to large-area data collection in VANETs. This technique detects and drops false data
sooner for protecting data integrity when data is forwarded, reduces the cost of
communication overhead, and avoids base (roadside unit) deception.
1.6 Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following manner. In Chapter 2
background of this dissertation is explained, and related work is introduced for securing
data transmission to ensure data integrity in WSNs, MANETs are VANETs. In Chapter 3,
to protect data integrity in WSNs for multiple applications using CDAMA, an integrated
technique is proposed to solve CDAMA weakness. Chapter 4 provides reliable and secure
data transmission (data integrity scheme) in MANETs under blackhole attack for achieving
effective communication in MANETs based on modified ad-hoc on-demand multipath
distance vector (AOMDV) protocol. Chapter 5 presents an integrated technique into CSDC to protect the integrity data in VANETs. The performance matrices, the numerical and
simulation results are provided to prove the performance evaluation. Finally, conclusions
and future work is discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter overviews background and related work on various aspects of the
research to be necessary for this dissertation. Section 2.1 discusses some methodologies in
routing protocols and homomorphic encryptions related to this dissertation such as
AOMDV, HME, CDAMA, and CS-DC, etc. Section 2.2 introduces related work. Section
2.2.1 discusses 1) the general concept of the data aggregation technique for data
transmission in WSNs and its features, 2) the security methods of the aggregation technique
in WSNs and several previous works to secure data aggregation to ensure data integrity in
WSNs, and finally, 3) one of the most popular scheme (CDAMA) for securing data
aggregation in WSNs and its security weakness. Section 2.2.2 discusses 1) two phases in
MANETs for sending data from the source to the destination and its routing protocols for
this purpose such as AOMDV, 2) the security issues in the second phase, data transmission
phase in MANET, and 3) at the end of this section part, some previous studies of protecting
data transmission phase to ensure data integrity in MANETs. Finally, section 2.2.3
discusses some previous proposes for data integrity protection in VANETs using different
schemes.

2.1 Background
2.1.1 Ad hoc On-Demand Multipath Distance Vector Routing (AOMDV)
AOMDV is dependent on the distance vector theory and utilizes a hop-by-hop
routing technique. Furthermore, AOMDV also discovers routes on demand using a route
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discovery method. The most important variation is the number of routes found in each route
discovery [16].
The basis of the AOMDV protocol lies in guaranteeing that multiple routes revealed are
loop-free and disjoint, and competently discovering such paths using flood-based route
discovery. AOMDV paths revise rules exploited locally at every node and play a major
role in preserving loop-freedom and disjoint characteristics.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of the MANET. In AOMDV, the route discovery
procedure is initiated by route request (RREQ) when source nodes have some data for
sending to the specific destination. The source node S broadcasts RREQ messages for the
destination node D and then waits for route reply (RREP). When nodes B, M, and Q receive
the RREQ from a source node S, they mark it in the last hop field to distinguish multiple
paths. For example, the RREQ passed through node B is marked as RREQ(B). Also, each
RREQ message has its sequence number and each node maintains the highest sequence
number for a destination among received RREQ messages to prevent loops. When
receiving a RREQ message, the intermediate nodes compare the destination sequence
numbers between RREQ with their routing table and then flood the RREQ to others.
Finally, if the RREQ message reaches its destination, the destination node generates a
RREP message and sends it back along the reverse route. In order to form multiple paths,
it generates RREP messages for every RREQ message that comes through a disjoint path.
Moreover, AOMDV protocol also makes intermediary nodes available with alternate
routes since they are established to help drop route discovery frequency [17].
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Figure 2.1 Route discovery procedure in AOMDV
2.1.2 Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption is the encryption on the already encrypted data rather
than on the original data with providing the result as it is done on the plain text.
Homomorphic algorithms provide a means whereby arithmetic operation on the ciphertext
produces the same result as the arithmetic operation on the plaintext. Homomorphic
encryption (HME) is categorized into partial (PHE), somewhat (SWE), or fully (FHE).
Figure 2.2 shows the progress that has been made on HME. In the figure, the innermost
circle represents the partial encryption scheme. The second layer shows that the scheme
has evolved from the PHE phase to SWE. While SWE is an improvement over PHE, FHE

Figure 2.2 Homomorphic encryption category
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The complex mathematical operations can be performed on the ciphertext without
changing the nature of the encryption [18].
2.1.2.1 Partial homomorphic encryption
Partial homomorphism offers one computational operation at a time. An example
of partial homomorphic encryption is the addition or multiplication of data.

2.1.2.2 Somewhat homomorphic encryption
Partial homomorphic encryption is capable of either multiplicity or addition but not
both. Therefore, the scheme is incapable of protecting of confidentiality of information
during computation in the cloud. Somewhat homomorphic encryption SHE is more general
than PHE in the sense that it supports homomorphic operations with additions and
multiplications. The drawback is that you can perform only a limited number of
homomorphic operations.
2.1.2.3 Fully homomorphic encryption
Moving from SHE to FHE, the issues of limited depths were addressed. One of the
proposed solutions is to bring the noise to its lowest level. However, this solution may
require a secret key which theoretically is unavailable for homomorphic encryption.
Table 2.1 shows the categorizations of the three homomorphic algorithms in tabular
form that can perform computation on encrypted data. While FHE has the capability of
computation on both multiplication and addition, it has a major setback in memory usage.
SWE is an improvement over PHE, but it suffers from a limited depth circuit. PHE can
only do one operation, multiplication or addition, but not both.
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Table 2.1 Comparison of homomorphic encryption

2.1.2.4 Properties of homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption has mainly two properties:
Additive homomorphic encryption [19]: A homomorphic encryption is additive, if
Ek (PT1⊕PT2) = Ek (PT1) ⊕ Ek (PT2)
Using an additive homomorphic approach, the sum of the cyphertexts is equal to their
encrypted sum, the product of a ciphertext, E(X) + E(Y) = E (X + Y).
Multiplicative homomorphic encryption [19]: Homomorphic encryption is multiplicative,
if
Ek (PT1⊗PT2) = Ek (PT1) ⊗ Ek (PT2).
Using multiplicative homomorphism, the product of the cyphertexts is equal to its
encrypted product, E(X). E(Y) = E (X. Y).
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2.1.3 Enhanced homomorphic cryptosystem (EHC)
Homomorphic encryption is the operation on the encrypted data which can offer
the same results after calculations as the working straightly on the clear data.
Homomorphic encryption schemes have the property of additive, multiplicative or mixed
multiplicative homomorphism. In additive property, performing decryption on the sum of
two ciphertexts is the same as the addition of two plaintexts represented as D(a + b) = D(a)
+ D(b). In multiplicative property, performing decryption on the product of two ciphertexts
is the same as the multiplication of the two plaintexts represented as D(a * b) = D(a) *
D(b). In mixed multiplicative property, performing decryption on the product of one
ciphertext plaintext is the same as the multiplication of two plaintexts, represented as D(a
* b) = D(a) * b [19].
In our proposed scheme in this dissertation, EHC [20] [21] is used as cryptographic
algorithms based on additive homomorphic encryption. The general practical structure for
the encryption and decryption scenario of the EHC scheme is introduced below. This
cryptosystem uses a large number m, where m = p × q. Here p and q are large prime
numbers, which are kept secret. q is a sharing secret key. The number m is also a secret key
to encrypt the data. Finding a random number r seems to be an extremely difficult problem
because it will be generated randomly, which is kept secret. In principle, the EHC scheme
consists of three main procedures: the key generation (K), the encryption algorithm (E),
and the decryption algorithm (D), as illustrated below.
Secret key generation (K):
p, q ∈ P, where P is prime, and m = p * q.
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Generate a random number r.
The set of original plaintext messages P = Zp = {x: x <= p}, Zm = {x: x < m} has the set
of ciphertext messages.
Secret values r, m, and q.
Shared key K = p.
Encryption (E):
x ∈ Zp.
The ciphertext C is calculated as y = Ep (x)= (x + r × pq) (mod m).
Decryption (D):
The plaintext x is recovered as x = Dp (y) = y mod p.
2.1.4 Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
The mathematics of elliptic curves, used in cryptography, uses the fundamental
basic theory. An elliptic curve in its “standard form” is described by for some fixed values
for the parameters a and b [22].
y2= x3 + ax + b
EC is used in place of a Galois Field GF(p), where p is a prime number as typically
modulo arithmetic, or characteristic 2 fields, such as irreducible polynomial fields, e.g. GF
(22). Cryptography on elliptic curves is based on scalar multiplication of points on the
elliptic curves, as the basic operation. The location of the multiplicative inverse over the
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elliptic curve is the challenging part. Scalar multiplication is also known as pointmultiplication [23].
An elliptic curve over 𝐹𝑞 is defined in terms of the solutions to an equation in 𝐹𝑞 .
The form of the equation defining an elliptic curve over 𝐹𝑞 differs depending on whether
the field is a prime finite field or a characteristic 2 finite field.
Let 𝐹𝑝 be a prime finite field so that p is an odd prime number and let 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐹𝑝 satisfying
4×a3+27×b2 (mod p). Then, an elliptic curve E(𝐹𝑝 ) over 𝐹𝑝 defined by the parameters
𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐹𝑝 consists of the set of solutions or points P=(x, y) for x, y ∈ 𝐹𝑝 to the equation:
y2= x3 + ax + b (mod p)
together with an extra point O called the point at infinity.
The equation y2= x3 + ax + b (mod p) is called the defining equation of E (𝐹𝑝 ). For
a given point P = (xp, yp), xp is called the x-coordinate of P, and yp is called the y-coordinate
of P.
The number of points on E(𝐹𝑝 ) is denoted by # E(𝐹𝑝 ). Then, Hesse’s theorem states that:
𝑝 + 1 − 2√𝑝 ≤ 𝑝 #𝐸(𝐹𝑝 ) ≤ 𝑝 + 1 + 2√𝑝
It is possible to define an additional rule to add points on E. The addition rule is
specified as follows:
Rule to add the point at infinity to itself:
𝑂+𝑂 =𝑂
Rule to add the point at infinity to any other point:
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(𝑥, 𝑦) + (𝑥, −𝑦) = 𝑂 for all (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐸(𝐹𝑝 )
Rule to add two points with the same x-coordinates when the points are either distinct or
have y-coordinate 0:
(𝑥, 𝑦) + (𝑥, −𝑦) = 𝑂 for all (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝐸(𝐹𝑝 )
Rule to add two points with different x-coordinates: Let (x1, y1) ∈ E (𝐹𝑝 ) and (x2, y2) ∈ E(𝐹𝑝 )
be two points such that 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2 . Then, (𝑥1 , 𝑦2 ) + (𝑥2 , 𝑦2 ) = (𝑥3 , 𝑦3 ), where 𝑥3 ≡ λ2 −
2𝑥1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 p), 𝑦3 ≡ 𝜆, (𝑥1 − 𝑥3 ) − 𝑦1 (mod 𝑝), and
𝑦 −𝑦

𝜆 ≡ 𝑥 2− 𝑥1 (mod 𝑝).
2

1

Rule to add a point to itself (double a point): Let (x1, y1) ∈ E (𝐹𝑝 ) be a point with 𝑦1 ≠ 0.
Then (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ) + (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ) = (𝑥3 , 𝑦3 ), where:
𝑥3 ≡ λ2 − 2𝑥1 (𝑚𝑜𝑑 p), 𝑦3 ≡ 𝜆, (𝑥1 − 𝑥3 ) − 𝑦1 (mod 𝑝) and 𝜆 ≡

3 𝑥12 +𝑎
2𝑦1

(mod p).

The set of points on E (𝐹𝑝 ) forms a group under this additional rule. Furthermore, the group
is abelian meaning that 𝑃1 + 𝑃2 = 𝑃2 + 𝑃1 for all points 𝑃1 , 𝑃2 ∈ E (𝐹𝑝 ). Notice that the
addition rule can always be computed efficiently using simple field arithmetic.
Cryptographic schemes based on ECC rely on scalar multiplication of elliptic curve
points. Given an integer k and a point 𝑃 ∈ E (𝐹𝑝 ), scalar multiplication is the process of
adding P to k times. The result of this scalar multiplication is denoted k x P or kP. Scalar
multiplication of elliptic curve points can be computed efficiently using the addition rule
together with the double-and-add algorithm or one of its variants [24].
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2.1.5 Privacy Homomorphism
A privacy homomorphism is an encryption transformation which allows direct
computation on the encrypted data. However, symmetric cryptography-based privacy
homomorphism has been proved to be insecure in chosen plaintext attacks for some
specific parameters [25]. Therefore, privacy homomorphism based on asymmetric
cryptography should be used instead of privacy homomorphism based on symmetric
cryptography for some mission-critical networks.
2.1.5.1 BGN Scheme
Boneh et al. [26] proposed a PH scheme (abbreviated as BGN) based on the
encryption schemes. Both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms are provided in
BGN; however, a multiplicative homomorphism is inefficient and very expensive for
WSNs because it is based on the bilinear pairing. Hence, we only adopt additive
homomorphism of BGN to this dissertation. The additive homomorphic encryption of
BGN can be applied to private data aggregation, which is described in Figure 2.3.
Due to the large computational overhead of asymmetric cryptography, Boneh et al.
constructed BGN on a cyclic group of elliptic curve points. In phase 1 of the BGN scheme,
supposing E is the set of elliptic curve points that form a cyclic group. Supposing g is a
point in E, ord(G) denotes the order of a point G. If ord(G) = q, there is q*G= ∞, where ∞
is the identity element of the group. In phase 2, point addition and scalar multiplication
over points g and H are used to encrypt the message M. Ciphertext C is composed of the
message part and the secure randomness. In phase 3, BGN can aggregate the ciphertext
due to homomorphic property. As we can see, the aggregated result will be the form of
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∑ 𝑀 ∗ 𝐺 + ∑ 𝑅 ∗ 𝐻, where ∑ 𝑀 is the sum of the messages, and ∑ 𝑅 is the sum of the
randomness. In phase 4, BGN can decrypt the aggregated result to get the plaintext by
multiplying the result with the private key. When randomness of point H is removed by
multiplying the order of H, we can obtain ord(𝐻) ∗ ∑ 𝑀 ∗ 𝐺. Finally, the plaintext ΣM can
be retrieved by applying the discrete logarithm. Elliptic curve points that form a cyclic
group, ord(E) denotes the number of points in E [27].

Figure 2.3 BGN scheme
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2.1.5.2 CDAMA Scheme
CDAMA scheme [28] is a modification of the BGN scheme to fit multiple
applications in WSNs, and it is also constructed on a cyclic group elliptic curve points, but
it is designed by using three or more elliptic curve points, depending on the number of
applications in the wireless system. Consider that we have two applications in WSN, and
we will use three points whose orders are different prime numbers. The scalars of the first
two points hold aggregated messages, and the scalar of the third point holds randomness
for security. By multiplying the aggregated ciphertext with the private key of the first
application, the scalar of the first point holding the aggregated message can be obtained.
Also, by multiplying the aggregated ciphertext with the private key of the second
application, the scalar of the second point holding the aggregated message can be obtained.
CDAMA also contains four procedures: key generation, encryption, aggregation,
and decryption as listed below. The key generation (KEYGEN) generates public and
private key pairs for each application by using the set of elliptic curve points which form a
cyclic group. In encryption function (ENC), a sensor node verifies if the size of their sensed
reading is less than or equal to the acceptable message size of an application. Next, an
integer R is randomly selected from [0,.., n-1]. Then, the second sensed reading is
encrypted and transmitted as ciphertext based on point addition and scalar multiplication
over points. The aggregation function (AGG) aggregates ciphertexts via point addition for
each application and aggregates randomness for all applications. In the decryption function
(DEC) base station decrypts the aggregated result to obtain the whole message. Next, it
removes the randomness by multiplying the result by the private key for each application,
and then it extracts the aggregated message corresponding to each application.
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2.1.6 CS-DC scheme
Compressive sensing-based data collection (CS-DC) is the first scheme that utilizes
the compressive sensing theory to large-area data collection in VANETs. In CS-DC, CS
theory is used to compress and recover in-network spatial relevant data. Also, the CS theory
is applied for data coding/decoding, which will achieve a simple encoding process and
effective decoupling of data compression from data transmission structure. The objective
of compressive sensing-based data collection (CS-DC) is to reduce data transmission
overhead without introducing intensive computation or complicated transmission control.
Besides, it ensures reliable data transmission and accurate data collection, by utilizing the
data spatial correlation pattern on the decoder end to accurately recover data [29].
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Related work to secure aggregation data forwarding in WSNs
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a group of sensors restricted in battery power,
computational ability, and storage. In the network, an important issue is the minimization
of energy consumption. To save energy, data aggregation is put forward as an in-network
processing which is led by the aggregator nodes. An aggregator can aggregate data from
its child sensors and sends the aggregation results to a higher-level aggregator. Finally, it
transmits the aggregation results to the base station via the wireless link [31]. Obviously,
communication overhead is decreased since the aggregated value is transmitted to the base
station. Thus, data aggregation is very helpful to increase the WSN’s overall lifetime.
However, data aggregation only is not enough in the WSN because the adversary can easily
change the aggregated result and inject false data if any node is compromised, which will
result in incorrect aggregate value at the base station. This attack is called a false data
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injection attack [32]. This attack may not only exhaust out the limited energy of the sensor
nodes which forward these data, thus reduce their lifetime in the network, but also it may
cause false alerts due to false sensing data. Consequently, ensuring data aggregation is a
big concern. For securing data aggregation, recently many proposals have been made. In
most of these studies, each original data can be checked by the base station for data integrity
for a single application environment.
To achieve secure data aggregation, two methods can be used for secure data
aggregation in WSNs: hop-by-hop encrypted data aggregation and end-to-end encrypted
data aggregation. In conventional hop-by-hop aggregation schemes [33], an aggregator has
to decrypt each received message, then aggregate all messages and, finally, encrypt the
aggregated result before forwarding to the next node or base station. Thus, we need
aggregators for storing decryption keys and, a compromised aggregator can detect
transmitting messages or tamper aggregated results. In end-to-end data aggregation
schemes [34], encrypted data are directly aggregated by aggregators, not through the data
decryption; thus, the secret information cannot be accessed by compromised aggregators.
Here, homomorphic encryption schemes [35] [36] [37] can provide end-to-end data
confidentiality. Parmar et al. [34] proposed a method to ensure the integrity, privacy, and
en route aggregation of traffic in WSNs. It used two different homomorphic primitives,
homomorphic encryption and homomorphic message authentication code (HMAC). Here,
false data in the network is filtered using MAC, and data integrity at the base station is
achieved using the HMAC algorithm. The proposed protocol protects the sensor readings
against insiders and outsider adversaries. They believe that the proposed protocol helps to
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improve resource utilization in resource-constrained environments while achieving the
desired security aims.
Chen et al. [38] introduced two concealed data aggregation schemes, one for
homogeneous and the other for heterogeneous WSNs. Here, each sensing data is recovered
by two base stations, and each original data is checked for integrity, while the cluster head
aggregates the data. The schemes are integrated with the aggregate signature scheme so
that data integrity and authenticity is assured. Boudia et al. [10] introduced a secure
aggregation scheme utilizing symmetric homomorphic skill and stateful public key
cryptography. It uses additive homomorphic encryption and aggregate MAC to provide
end-to-end confidentiality and end-to-end integrity. Shim et al. [39] introduced a data
aggregation scheme assuring hop-by-hop authentication and end-to-end confidentiality.
The scheme utilizes a signature scheme and a homographic scheme, but it costs
computation and communication overhead.
To aggregate data into a single ciphertext in many different applications, Lin et al.
[28] introduced the CDAMA scheme, which can aggregate ciphertexts from different
applications into a single ciphertext, and the base station can extract application-specific
data from aggregated ciphertexts. Each cluster group the sensor nodes running different
applications. The application-specific data are encrypted by each sensor node and then
transmitted to the corresponding cluster head. The data are aggregated by the cluster head
and transmitted to the next aggregator or base station. Here, application-specific data are
separated by the base station from the received aggregated ciphertext. However, this
scheme does not achieve data integrity protection which might lead to large communication
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overhead when sensor nodes are compromised to inject false data into the network during
both the aggregating and forwarding process of data to mislead the base station [40]
2.2.2 Related work to secure data forwarding in MANET
In MANET, each node can join the network, while at the same time other nodes
leave it or fail to connect because they move to a region that is not in the covering range of
the network. Here, each node involves operations such as route discovery or data
forwarding in the network. For this purpose, multiple routing protocols have been
proposed. Most of the protocols focus on two types of routing algorithms: the table-driven
type (proactive type) and the on-demand type (reactive type) like AODV, DSDV, DSR, or
even multipath protocols like AOMDV according to the way of discovering and
maintaining the routes [41]. Since data forwarding is dependent on each intermediate node,
securing data transmission is an important issue [42].
The security in MANETs has become an active area of research, especially for
applications such as emergency operations, military applications, vehicular applications,
etc. [43]. In such an environment, malicious or selfish nodes can disrupt or even deny the
communications of any node within the networking domain. In MANETs, every node in
the network is required to assist in the network establishment, its maintenance, and the
network operation. In MANETs unique techniques define the network environment such
as network topology is continuously changed, storage is limited, wireless links are not
secure, and there exist many limitations [44]. Due to MANET’s inherent characteristics
mentioned above, it is necessary to save or secure data transmission to achieve effective
communication in MANETs because most of the routing protocols proposed for MANET’s
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assume a trusted and reliable environment and they do not consider the security issues in
their initial designs.
The communication in MANETs includes two phases, the route discovery phase,
and the data transmission phase, and both phases are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. In
the first phase, adversaries can disrupt the route discovery by impersonating the
destination, responding with stale routing information, or distributing fake control traffic.
However, adversaries can also disrupt the data transmission phase and, thus, incur
significant data loss by tampering with, falsely redirecting, or even dropping data traffic
[45]. To provide comprehensive security in MANETs, both phases of communication must
be protected.
Securing the data forwarding has received relatively less interest in works, although
several proposals have been handed out with the problem of secure ad hoc routing. Previous
studies of protecting the data forwarding can be classified into three categories: information
spread with end-to-end security, localized collaboration, and information cross-validation,
and applying cryptographic primitives.
2.2.2.1 Information spread with end-to-end security
There exist some previous studies of protecting the data forwarding based on
information spread with end-to-end security. The main idea of information spread with
end-to-end security is to defend the data transmission against the malicious behavior of
other nodes. It provides further protection to secret messages from being compromised
when they are delivered across the insecure network. It is based on information spread and
end-to-end security. Papadimitratos and Haas [45] proposed a secure data transmission
scheme in MANETs. It operates just in an end-to-end procedure, exploits the redundancy
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of multipath routing, and adapts its operation to remain efficient and effective even in
highly adverse environments. It operates without limited intuition on the security
associations and network trust and it affords the loss of data along with adjusting its
operation to the network circumstances. Lou, et al. [46] proposed a security protocol for
reliable data delivery to enhance the data confidentiality service in a MANET. The basic
idea in this scheme is to transform a secret message into multiple shares by secret sharing
schemes and then deliver the shares via multiple independent paths to the destination so
that even if a small number of nodes are compromised, the whole secret message is not
compromised. The main problem of these schemes is that every node in the network needs
to establish a security association with every other node in the network, thereby increasing
overhead.
Wazid, et al. [7] [8] [49] proposed new efficient techniques for the detection and
prevention of multiple attacker nodes in WSNs. In these techniques, the entire WSN is
divided into several clusters and each cluster has a powerful high-end sensor node, which
is called a cluster head and is responsible for the detection of attacker nodes, if present, in
that cluster. Also, these techniques are suitable for the resource-constrained sensor nodes
due to low computation and communication overheads. Satav, et al. [50] proposed a
technique to secure route selection in the adverse environment in MANETs. The proposed
approach added a route reliability parameter in the routing table to categorize the paths as
reliable or unreliable, but this addition increases the computational and storage overhead
while reduces the packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay. This proposal deals with
security issues in the route discovery stage, but our proposal deals with those in the data
transmission stage.
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2.2.2.2 Localized collaboration and information cross-validation
The main idea of localized collaboration and information cross-validation is that
local neighboring nodes collaboratively monitor and tolerate each other, while no single
node is superior to the others. It exploits localized collaboration and information crossvalidation to protect the network in a self-organized manner. Yang, et al. [51] proposed
self-organized network-layer security. It does not concern itself with any form of
cryptographic security on the messages being routed. Instead, it covers the network from
malicious nodes by detection and reaction to misbehaviors. It is a network-layer security
solution that protects routing and forwarding operations in an integrated framework. The
main problem with this scheme is that the energy consumption of this approach is too large.
2.2.2.3 Applying cryptographic primitives
Chinthanai, et al. [52] proposed enhanced adaptive acknowledgment for intrusion
detection. It uses a digital signature to prevent the attacker from fabricating
acknowledgment packets. The scheme shows higher malicious-behavior-detection rates in
certain situations while not affecting the network performances. Tan et al. [53] proposed a
mechanism to secure data transmission using the AES cryptographic primitive with the
underlying protocol as AODV. This scheme specifically targets the blackhole attacks with
the importance of improving network parameters like throughput and packet delivery ratio.
Ertaul, et al. [54] used elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and threshold cryptosystem (TC)
to securely deliver a message, splitting the message into pieces before or after using ECC
to encrypt them individually and sending them to the receiver. At the receiving side, each
share of the secret is decrypted using ECC to get the original message. The main problem
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of the previous schemes produces additional routing overhead in cases of a well-informed
adversary.
Sultana, et al. [55] proposed a method to secure data packets despite black hole
attacks in MANETs through the AOMDV routing protocol. ECC has been chosen to secure
the packets against blackhole attacks. The main problem of this proposal is that it does not
completely avoid blackhole attacks due to dropping the message even if it is encrypted.
Besides, there exist some proposals generating automated mechanisms. They choose the
alternate path automatically that will be reliable and secure. Also, Jain, et al. [56] proposed
an improved version of the AODV routing protocol using a homomorphic encryption
scheme which prevents pollution attacks and accomplishes in maintaining integrity
security standards by following minimum hop count path. It allows an intermediate node
to perform XOR operation on arriving data. The core technique involved in this technique
is the Message Authentication Code (MAC) based on Universal Hash Function (UHF).
However, the minimum hop count path may lead to congestion in the network. Rangasami,
et al. proposed a protocol [57] analyzing the usefulness and threats that will be faced by
the service providers while taking up the homomorphic encryption schemes to provide
confidentiality of data stored in cloud computing. From this study, they concluded that the
homomorphic encryption scheme paves a new way of securing data in the cloud and it
enables cloud service providers to serve the clients in a more efficient way by preserving
the data confidentiality and integrity.
In summary, most of the previous work for securing AOMDV protocol in MANETs
cannot avoid black hole attacks because an attack drops data even if it is encrypted. Our

31

proposed scheme seems to be more reliable and secure to deliver encrypted data to the
destination.
2.2.3 Related work to secure data integrity in VANETs
Hegde et. al. [58] introduced a scheme for integrity checking with the support of
the Roadside Unit (RSU) for the dynamic vehicular cloud. The hash functions and
signatures are employed for integrity checking of messages which are uploaded from the
vehicle to the cloud. This scheme verified the integrity of data in a vehicular cloud storage
with the least communication and computation cost. Also, it provides identity preservation
and remote integrity verification. It ensures security for data tampering and application
attack. The only disadvantage joined to this scheme is the high redundant data on VCC.
Asalam et. al. [59] presented two novel approaches to providing reliable traffic information
propagation, two-directional data verification, and time-based data verification. The traffic
message is sent through two channels. A recipient vehicle verifies the message integrity by
checking if data received from both channels are matched. The biggest advantage of this
scheme is that it is simple to set up for reliable data transmission without any additional
roadside infrastructure or dedicated public key infrastructure for a VANET. The design of
this approach is to provide sufficient, not necessarily perfect, security mechanisms that are
simple and economical to implement in the real world. Azogu et al. [60] proposed an
asymmetric profit-loss Markov (APLM) model to measure the integrity level of security
schemes for VANET content delivery. With a black-box approach, the model documents
the incidents of detecting data corruption as profit and those of accepting corrupted data as
a loss. Using Markov chain, profit defines integrity gain to a system by its devices detecting
and disregarding corrupted data fragments.
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CHAPTER 3

Protecting Data Integrity for Multi-Application Environment in
Wireless Sensor Networks
This chapter describes the security issue in the data aggregation and forwarding in
WSNs and proposes a method, specifically for protecting data integrity in WSNs which
prevents the altered aggregation value from the compromised nodes to be aggregated or
forwarded to the next node or base station. Section 1 of this chapter defines the problem in
the CDAMA scheme which is used in WSNs to aggregate the encrypted data of different
applications separately. Section 2 defines the network model in our scheme which is based
on a cluster-based aggregation structure and a brief scenario of this scheme as an example.
Also, it explains the weak point in the CDAMA scheme used in WSNs. Section 3 of this
chapter proposes the integrated technique into the CDAMA scheme using message
authentication code (MAC) protocol to detect and drop false data sooner for protecting data
integrity when data is aggregated and forwarded and to overcome any bogus data in the
network early for reducing the cost of communication overhead and avoiding base station
deception. Section 4 includes the numerical results to calculate the communication
overhead of CDAMA and ECDAMA (proposed in this chapter) scheme. Then, Section 5
describes the performance parameters behind the main metrics of our performance
evaluation and provides the results after the simulation by using NS3. In this section, the
performance of ECDAMA and CDAMA is compared using two parameters in the presence
of the false data in the network. Finally, section 6 provides a conclusion of this chapter.
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3.1 Problem definition
Consider that multiple applications of sensor networks having different purposes,
such as temperature detectors and fire alarms, may be installed in the same environment.
Suppose that we want to monitor the sensed readings of these applications. To achieve this
goal, CDAMA is the only convenient scheme that can be used to aggregate the encrypted
data of different applications separately. Since some of these reading nodes are often
deployed in the unintended environment, they may be captured or compromised by the
adversary. Thus, an adversary can inject false data into aggregated ciphertexts to deceive
the base station. Certainly, in a false data injection attack, an adversary does not need to
know anything about the data aggregated to inject it. Thus, the confidentiality of data
aggregation in the CDAMA scheme does not prevent this kind of attack. Hence, this
scheme does not have data integrity protection, which might cause large communication
overhead or deceive base station by injecting false data into the network during both
aggregation and forwarding of data.
3.2 System model
We define two system models; network architecture is defined in the network
model and an attack is defined in the adversary model.
3.2.1 Network model
It consists of several sensor nodes uniformly deployed in the network and one base
station. In our scheme which is based on a cluster-based aggregation structure [61], each
cluster has multiple sensors for reading different applications, A and B, and a cluster head
as an aggregator to forward data from sensor nodes to another aggregator or the base
station. We assume that some sensor nodes are assigned as aggregators AGi to aggregate
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data from their neighboring nodes, and there are at least two nodes on the communication
path between any two consecutive data aggregators. We indicate the closest node to the
aggregator as the neighboring node Ni or monitoring node Mi and the other node in the
same path as forwarding node Fi where i = 1, 2, 3,…
Figure 3.1 shows a brief scenario of this scheme as an example. Let there are three
rooms at the same building and each room has multiple sponsors for reading data from
applications A and B. Also, each room has a cluster head as an aggregator to forward data
to another aggregator or the base station. When the data are combined by the aggregator
AG4, it computes message authentication code (MAC) by a shared key with the next
aggregator AG5 and broadcasts the aggregated data to its adjoining nodes such as
monitoring node M to calculate the sub-message authentication code (Sub-MAC) from
MAC by a shared key with forwarding node F and the neighboring node N. Then, when
the data reaches the forwarding node F, it computes the Sub-MAC of the aggregated data
again, and then matches it by Sub-MAC of its corresponding monitoring node M. If the
verification fails, forwarding node F discards this aggregated data immediately and informs
AG4. Otherwise, if verification is successful, F forwards this data to the next forwarding
node or aggregator AG5. AG5 computes the MAC of the data is collected for the data
integrity. If MAC of AG5 is not equal to MAC of the previous aggregator AG4, AG5
discards this data and informs the previous aggregator AG4. Also, before data aggregation,
neighboring node N of AG5 which is corresponding to monitoring node M of AG4 verifies
the data integrity by computing the Sub-MAC from MAC using the shared key. If the
verification fails, AG5 discards this data and informs AG4. Otherwise, the aggregation is
performed by the current aggregator AG5 and its monitoring node M. This repeats
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calculating Sub-MAC by monitoring node of AG5, then forwarding the aggregated data to
the next forwarding node of AG5, and so on till reaching the base station.

Figure 3.1 The network structure of the proposed scheme
3.2.2 Adversary model
Sensor nodes can be compromised by adversaries due to their distribution in the
unintended environment. A compromised node can be used to launch a variety of security
attacks. We assume that bogus data can be injected to WSNs by the compromised nodes
and data integrity can be altered. Here, the valid ciphertext can be generated and injected
into the network by an adversary to persuade the base station that the bogus data is true,
even though an adversary does not have any secret information. This leads to modify the
integrity of data during aggregation and forwarding in CDAMA.
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3.3 The proposed scheme
We assume that we have two applications, A and B in our WSN, then all sensor
nodes are divided into groups within sensors to serve these applications immediately as
explained in the previous section. As we mentioned, CDAMA has four procedures: key
generation, encryption, aggregation, and decryption. In our proposed scheme, we add one
more procedure into the CDAMA scheme, which is the integrity procedure verifying the
integrity of data while data is aggregated and transmitted. The procedure detects any false
data injected in the whole network before encrypted and aggregated data is delivered to the
base station. The basic idea of applying this verification is that a monitoring node computes
Sub-MAC from the MAC of the aggregated data, the corresponding forwarding node
verifies this Sub-MAC during data forwarding, and the neighboring node of aggregator
verifies it before the data aggregation. In detail, when aggregated data arrives at the
neighboring node of the aggregator, it calculates the Sub-MAC of the received data and
verifies the integrity of data that are sending from the backward aggregator, and thus data
integrity can be detected while the data is aggregated. Further, by the time aggregated data
arrives at the forwarding node of the forward aggregator, it calculates the Sub-MAC of the
received data and verifies the integrity from the aggregator to its forwarding node during
the data transmission process, and thus data integrity can be detected while the data is
aggregated. Hereinafter, we call our proposed scheme ECDAMA (Extended CDAMA).
Then, ECDAMA works in six phases as shown below:
3.3.1 Setup phase
It prepares network formation and preloads some secret keys for sensor nodes and
the base station.
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Set up a shared key between consecutive aggregators.
Two key pairs (public key and private key) are generated for application A and application
B using a cyclic group of elliptic curve points as following:
Based on security parameters T, compute q1, q2, q3, E, where the order of E = n, and n =
q1q2q3; q1, q2 , and q3 are selected from very large primes. g1, g2, and g3, three generators
are randomly picked up.
Compute point H = q1q2 × g3 and the order of H = q3.
T is selected and TA = TB = T/x. P is computed as q2q3 × g1 and PKA = {n, E, P, H, TA}. Q
is computed as q1q3 × g2 and PKB ={n, E, Q, H, TB}. Also, SKA is q2q3, and SKB is q1q3.
The base station informs the source nodes of the public keys P and Q to encrypt the messages
(M1 and M2). The sensor nodes will sense the encrypted messages.
3.3.2 Encryption phase
It is based on point addition and scalar multiplication over points P, Q, and H. As
we see below, the ciphertext is composed of the message and the secure randomness for
both applications.
The source checks if the sensed data is less than or equals to the maximum plaintext
boundary.
Selects randomly a value R which belongs to {1,.., n-1} for security.
Generates the ciphertext for each application A and B based on point addition and scalar
multiplication over points P, Q, and H.
Given the public key (PKA), a message for application A (M).
The ciphertext for a message M for application A is generated as CA = M × P + R × H.
The ciphertext for application B is generated as CB = M × Q + R × H.
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3.3.3 Integrity phase during the data aggregation
Referring to the network structure in the previous section, the current aggregator
AG4 collects data from its neighboring nodes and broadcasts to its neighboring nodes. The
current aggregator computes the Sub-MAC of the data is collected for the data integrity. If
the Sub-MAC of AG4 is not equal to the Sub-MAC of the previous aggregator AG1, AG2
, or AG3, the current aggregator discards this data and informs the previous aggregator.
Neighboring nodes check the integrity of data through Sub-MAC computing. This
data is discarded by AG4 and informed AG1, AG2, or AG3 if at least one checking fails.
Otherwise, the aggregation is performed by the current aggregator AG4 and its monitoring
nodes Mi’s. AG4 and Ni (neighboring node) make verification on the integrity of the
ciphertext from AGi while the data is aggregated s times where s is the number of
monitoring and forwarding pairs.
The last AGi transmits the data to the forwarding node Ni which transmits it to AG4. AG4
computes the Sub-MAC of ciphertext C to verify the data integrity. AG4 and AGi compute
Sub-MAC (C), respectively. If both values are different, AG4 informs AGi and drops the
data. Else, AG4 broadcasts the Ni, the neighboring node. AG4’s neighboring nodes, points
of AGi, monitoring nodes, make verification on the integrity of the data. Ni and Mi
(monitoring node of AGi) compute the Sub-MAC. If both values are different, AG4 informs
AGi and drops the data.
3.3.4 Aggregation phase
It aggregates ciphertexts via point addition, then the final result will be the form of
M × P + M × Q + R × H, where M is the sum of the messages for each application and R
is the sum of the randomness. Data aggregation (C’) of two ciphertexts which are verified
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by AG4 and Ni’s. C’ = CA + CB; C’ = ƩMi × P + ƩMj × Q + ƩRi × H. Then, AG4 computes
Sub-MAC (C’) using the key shared with AG5. Mi of AG4 uses the key that is shared with
Ni of AG5 and Fi of AG4 to compute Sub-MAC (C’). Then, each Mi sends its Sub-MAC
(C’) to AG4. Now, AG4 forms a packet containing C’, full Sub-MACs (C’), and transmits
the packet to the first forwarding node. Here, i, j = 1, 2, 3,…
3.3.5 Integrity phase during the data forwarding
When the forwarding node F of AG4 receives the aggregated data, it computes the
Sub-MAC of the aggregated data which is aggregated by its corresponding monitoring node
M and then matches this Sub-MAC. If the verification fails, forwarding node F discards this
data immediately and informs AG4. Otherwise, if verification is successful, F forwards this
data to the next forwarding node or AG5. When the aggregated data arrives at AG5, it
verifies the Sub-MAC which is calculated by AG4. If this verification is successful, repeat
the procedure of integrity phase during data aggregation to verify the data integrity during
data aggregation, then do the aggregation phase again. F (forwarding node) of AG4 verifies
the data integrity of encrypted aggregated data (C’) during data transmission. The following
procedure repeats h times, where h is the number of monitoring and neighboring pair. If Fi
is not a pair of AG4 monitoring node Mi, then Fi sends the received packet to AG5 or the
next forwarding node. Else Fi checks the Sub-MAC (C’). If the Sub-MAC (C’) computed
by Fi and its pair Mi of AG4 are equal, the data is verified, and Fi sends the packet to AG5
or the next forwarding node. Else, Fi informs AG4 and discards the packet.
3.3.6 Decryption phase
It decrypts the encrypted aggregated data to obtain the message value M for each
application A and B. The decryption function releases the randomness of point H by
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multiplying the result with the private key for each application. Then the ciphertext contains
only the product of P and Q such that we can apply the discrete logarithm to retrieve the
value M for each application A and B. The base station receives the final aggregated result
that can be obtained by decrypting it using private keys SKA, SKB for each application A
and B. Then, compute M for application A as MA = ƩMi = logp’ q2q3 × C, where P’ = q2q3
× P. Also, compute M for application B as MB = ƩMj = logQ’ q1q3 × C, where Q’ = q1q3 ×
Q.
3.4 Numerical results
The communication overhead of ECDAMA, our proposed scheme, occurs as a
result of additional MACs produced by monitoring nodes during data forwarding and
transmission of data from aggregators to their monitoring nodes for aggregation and SubMAC computation. The message overhead of ECDAMA is four bytes per data packet
because it uses four bytes of MAC. So, the length of the data packet is considered the length
of data packet Ld in TinySec plus four bytes of MAC [62]. To compute the amount of data
transmitted over a sensor network, we assume that T is the number of true data packets
generated by legitimate nodes, and F is the number of false data packets injected by
compromised nodes. Thus, T/F is the ratio of true data to false data. Also, we assume that
the average number of hops between two consecutive data aggregators is H and the average
number of hops that a data packet travels in the network is Hd. In our proposed scheme
ECDAMA, a false data packet can be forwarded and detected during at most Hd hops
between two consecutive data aggregators. Moreover, each aggregator broadcasts data to its
monitoring nodes M and monitoring nodes in the reverse process send Sub-MACs to the
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data aggregator. Therefore, the amount of data transmitted over a sensor network in
ECDAMA is:
DECDAMA = (Ld + 4) [(T × H) + (F × Hd)]
+ M × (Ld + 4) × (T + F)
+ M × (4 / (M + 1)) × (T + F) bytes.
Let X = F/T
Then, DECDAMA = [(Ld + 4) [H + (X × Hd)]
+ (1 + X) [M × (Ld + 4)+ (4 M / (M + 1))]] × T bytes.

(3.1)

In the original CDAMA scheme, false data packets are not detected because the
scheme has no data integrity protection and therefore the whole data packets including false
data packets reach the base station by traveling H hops in the sensor networks. Therefore,
the amount of data transmitted over a sensor network in CDAMA is:

DCDAMA = Ld × H × (T + F)
= Ld × H × (1 + X) × T bytes.

(3.2)

By substituting H = 110, T = 2 and Ld = 41, which is the default size for TinySec
data packet [62] in (1) and (2). Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the total data transmission
of CDAMA and ECDAMA, respectively, as a function of the average number of hops that
a data packet travels in the network Hd or F/T, the ratio of false data to true data. Now, the
results show that the total data transmission of CDAMA is increased highly when the ratio
of false data to true data is increased as compared to the total data transmission of
ECDAMA due to the overhead of false data through data transmission. As we see in the
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figures when the false data to true data is equal, then the ratio is one and the average number
of hops Hd is so big, the total data transmission of ECDAMA is almost 50% less than the
CDAMA data transmission. From the results, we conclude that our scheme is better to be
implemented with a less average number of hops when the false data is increased gradually.
In addition to that, ECDAMA discovers and reduces false data transmission among
aggregators early. As shown in Figure 3.3, when the Hd is the smallest value two, and the
ratio is too high, then the total data transmission, in this case, is the lowest. In the end, we
clarify that ECDAMA sends fewer data compared to CDAMA because ECDAMA releases
the false data as soon as possible during the data forwarding and before data aggregation.
Moreover, even though both schemes show that the ratio of false data to true data is
increased, still the total data transmission in our proposed scheme ECDAMA is less than
the original scheme CDAMA when the number of hops Hd between two consecutive
aggregators is decreased because of the result of detecting and eliminating false data in the
proposed scheme.

Figure 3.2 Total data transmission of CDAMA versus the ratio of false data to true data
F/T
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Figure 3.3 Total data transmission of ECDAMA versus the number of hops between two
consecutive aggregators 𝐻𝑑 and the ratio of false data to true data F/T
3.5 Simulation Results
We make a simulation using network simulator 3 (ns3) [63]. It is designed
specifically to study the nature of wireless communication networks. The CDAMA
protocol is extended or modified to simulate our proposed scheme using the data integrity
phase. We define 220 nodes for our simulation. Some nodes are chosen as data aggregators
and distributed into the network area uniformly. Each node in a network is assigned a
position within the simulation dimensions (400 × 400 meters). Data is generated by the
located nodes at the bottom edge of the network. The base station is located at the top edge
of the network topology. In this simulation, the performance of ECDAMA is compared to
CDAMA using two parameters.
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3.5.1 Computational overhead
In WSNs, reducing the data overhead is important for the energy consumption, also,
for the security purposes, so detecting false data as early as possible in the network is very
helpful for the performance and the security. The computational overhead in our scheme
includes encryption, aggregation, MAC computations, and decryption. In Figure 3.4, we
compute the total number of computations of our scheme ECDAMA and the original
scheme CDAMA as a function of monitoring nodes. Here, the computation overhead of
the original CDAMA is less than ECDAMA because there is no impact of monitoring
nodes on CDAMA computation overhead, and the only overhead is encryption,
aggregation, and deception computations. Hence, the impact is only on the ECDAMA
scheme due to MAC computations by those nodes to produce Sub-MAC as corresponding
values for Sub-MAC of forwarding nodes and neighboring nodes for data integrity.
Therefore, when the number of monitoring nodes is increased, the number of MAC
computations in ECDAMA increases too. This overhead is necessary for the ability of our
scheme of detecting and eliminating false data during data aggregation and transmission.
Hence, we observe that our scheme ECDAMA has more computational overhead than the
original scheme CDAMA because of the capability of preventing false data injection
attacks.
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Figure 3.4 The total number of MAC computations as a function of the number of
monitoring nodes for CDAMA and ECDAMA
3.5.2 Communication overhead
The communication overhead of ECDAMA occurs at the transmission of MACs
during data forwarding and those data that are transmitted from data aggregators to their
neighboring nodes for aggregation and Sub-MAC computation. In this simulation scenario,
we assume that false data exists in the network by utilizing some compromised nodes. Then
the total data transmissions in the network for CDAMA and ECDAMA are shown as a
function of the ratio of false data to true data in Figure 3.5. Here, we observe that when the
ratio of false data to true data increases, total data transmission increases for both schemes
as well. But compared to the current CDAMA scheme, our scheme ECDAMA has fewer
total data transmission because of detecting and eliminating false data. As a result, when
false data is injected, ECDAMA can quickly detect and drop it before increasing data
overhead during data forwarding and aggregation, also before data reaching the base
station, which leads to less data transmission. But CDAMA has no such a technique to
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release the false data when increased during the data forwarding and aggregation, which
leads to large data transmission and energy consumption. Hence, even though there exists
communication overhead in our scheme, adding the data integrity phase into the ECDAMA
scheme still reduces the amount of overall data transmission in the network compared to
CDAMA. From the result, when the ratio of false data to true data is high, ECDAMA
improves data transmission about 50% compared to CDAMA, and this improvement is
achieved by detecting and dropping false data earlier, which is the main contribution of our
proposed scheme.

Figure 3.5 The total data transmission versus the ratio of fake data to true data for
CDAMA and ECDAMA
According to the communication overhead of ECDAMA which occurs as a result
of an additional MAC transmission produced by monitoring nodes for false data detection,
Figure 3.6 shows the effect of monitoring nodes on the communication overhead by
calculating the total data transmission in ECDAMA. As the number of monitoring nodes
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increases, total data transmission in the network will also increase. Hence, we observe that
increasing monitoring nodes from two to six results in increasing around 8% bytes total
data transmission only, which is considered acceptable percent. Hence, our scheme does
not provide too much data overhead when more monitoring pairs are added in the network
for data integrity.

Figure 3.6 The total data transmission versus the number of monitoring nodes for
ECDAMA

Because ECDAMA detects and eliminates false data between two consecutive data
aggregators, simulations are performed for various data aggregators in the network to show
the effect on the total data transmission in the presence of false data in the network. The
total data transmission of the network with ECDAMA and CDAMA is shown in Figure 3.7.
When the ratio of false data to true data is 1 and the network has 20 data aggregators,
ECDAMA results in almost 50% less data transmission as compared with CDAMA. Here,
as the number of data aggregators increases, the number of hops between data aggregators
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decreases, and ECDAMA detects false data earlier, thereby leading to less data transmission
over the network.
Table 3.1 Total Data Transmission for ECDAMA

F/T
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1

G=2
17221
18032
18740
19417
19963

G =4
17215
18017
18696
19257
19774

G =6
17175
17932
18610
19107
19545

G =8
17143
17812
18511
18947
19289

Aggregators
G = 10
G = 12
17126
17115
17712
17632
18400
18281
18747
18565
19009
18714

G = 14
17113
17572
18179
18374
18484

G = 16
17112
17527
18147
18193
18284

G = 18
17111
17502
18172
17991
18108

G = 20
17111
17513
18122
17903
18073

Figure 3.7 Total data transmission of ECDAMA in varying the number of data
aggregators G and the ratio of false data to true data F/T
However, in the case of the network with CDAMA, the amount of transmitted data
is not affected by the number of data aggregators as shown in Figure 3.8 simply because
false data are detected only at the base station.
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Table 3.2 Total Data Transmission for CDAMA

F/T
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8

G2
20023
24046
27488
30183

G=4
19983
23991
27428
30043

G=6
19958
23916
27331
29883

G=8
19918
23826
27206
29708

Aggregators
G = 10
19886
23711
27051
29513

1

33675

33485

33300

33125

32960

G =12
19863
23649
26876
29383
32796

G14
19845
23574
26741
29233

G16
19836
23556
26646
29128

G18
19840
23543
26561
29018

G20
19831
23537
26486
28939

32647

32532

32417

32334

Figure 3.8 Total data transmission of CDAMA in varying the number of data aggregators
G and the ratio of false data to true data F/T very
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Figure 3.9 Total data transmission of CDAMA and ECDAMA as the number of data
aggregators G and the ratio of false data to true data F/T very

3.6 Conclusion
In wireless sensor networks, compromised sensor nodes can deform the integrity of
data by injecting false data. The proposed scheme in this chapter has integrated a false data
detection technique by appending the integrity check technique using message
authentication codes into the CDAMA scheme, the first concealed data aggregation scheme
for a multi-application environment. From the performance analysis of our proposed
scheme ECDAMA, we could show that the computational and communication overhead is
considerably small, which means modifying the CDAMA scheme is achievable. Here, it
can reduce the transmission overhead to half compared to the original scheme in the
presence of false data. Also, we noticed that using plenty of monitoring pairs for data
integrity in our scheme has increased the percentage of the transmission overhead slightly,
leading us to implement our scheme to secure data integrity in WSNs.
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CHAPTER 4

Secure and Reliable Data Forwarding Using Homomorphic Encryption
against Blackhole Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
This chapter includes a proposal to provide reliable and secure data transmission
(data integrity) in MANETs under blackhole attack for achieving effective communication
in MANETs based on modified ad-hoc on-demand multipath distance vector (AOMDV)
protocol. Thus, our scheme is not an intrusion detection or intrusion isolation system, but
it is an intrusion avoidance system from malicious nodes because most of the routing
protocols proposed for MANET’s assume a trusted and reliable environment, and they do
not consider the security issues in their initial designs. Section 1 of this chapter addresses
the problem of the attack on the AOMDV protocol which prevents data delivery to the
destination. In section 2 of this chapter, the proposed scheme is introduced by modifying
the original protocol AOMDV and also, the procedure of the main idea, then a practical
example of the proposed scheme is explained. Section 3 analyzes our proposed algorithm
through numerical modeling. Section 4 describes the simulation methodology and
performance matrices are explained and then the simulation results are presented. Finally,
section 5 provides a conclusion of this chapter.
4.1 Problem statement
In multipath routing protocols like AOMDV, assume that the source node selects
the best route to forward packets to the destination node, which includes many malicious
nodes. These malicious nodes, placed on the route, forward the control packets but drop all
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data packets. Refer to Figure 4.1. Source node S sends packets to destination node D using
route {S, n1, n2, n3, n4, D}. Here, node n3 is malicious and drops the entire data packets
passing through it so they do not reach the destination node.
When the data transmission path includes a blackhole attacker, data is not delivered
to the destination as the attacker drops it. Also, when the entire data is sent via a single path
without dividing it up and encryption, the attacker gains a complete knowledge about the
data. The goal of the proposed scheme is to deliver and secure the entire message even if
some disjoint paths are not working due to malicious nodes (blackhole attacks).

Figure 4.1 Node S sends some packets to node D but node n3 drops all data packets

4.2 Proposed Scheme
In this section, the proposed scheme is introduced. First, we explain the procedure
of the main idea, then a brief practical example of the proposed scheme.
4.2.1 Main idea
The proposed protocol is implemented by modifying the original protocol AOMDV
as explained in the following and shown in Figure 4.2:
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A set of active disjoint paths n between a sender and a receiver is created. In our
network topology, n is assumed as the number of active routes in the topology, and it is a
fixed chosen value for creating multiple paths between a sender and a receiver to send a
part of the message. The sender routing table is prepared by adding all important details
for the data routing into each selected path in the topology between the sender and the
receiver. Combine these paths into groups G by dividing n by the desired number of paths
in each group by assuming that not less than two active paths in each group G = (n/2 or
more). Before sending the message (code), the sender assigns a unique message ID (msgid) to the entire message and divides it by the number of groups G for dismantling the entire
message M/G, where M is the entire message and G is the number of groups of combined
active disjoint paths.
Moreover, each part of the entire message m is associated with a unique part
message ID as (msg-sp-id1, msg-sp-id2, …,etc.) is used at the receiver side to gather the
entire message again.
Then, the sender encrypts all parts m1, m2, m3, …., etc. of the entire message using EHC
for getting Ep(m1), Ep(m2), Ep(m3), …, etc., where p is the secret key, and send them to
the receiver along with msg-id, msg-sp-id, msg-sp-id-sum through active disjoint paths in
each group, so each group will have only one encrypted part within the same message ID
and message part ID.
On the receiver side, to know the total number of encrypted parts of the entire message, we
use the message part ID sum ( msg-sp-id-sum ) within the encrypted parts.

54

Figure 4.2 The procedure of the proposed scheme
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The receiver recovers the whole message by adding up all encrypted parts of the
entire message that has the same message ID using the additive property in homomorphic
encryption scheme Ep(m1) + Ep(m2) + Ep(m3), …, etc. till reaching the message part IDs
sum, msg-sp-id-sum. If the receiver gets a duplicate part of encrypted parts of the message
which has the same message id and message part id, then it will discard the duplicated part.
Finally, the receiver decrypts the sum of all the encrypted parts of the message using EHC,
X = Dp (Ep(m1) + Ep(m2) + Ep (m3), …, etc.) to recover the original message M.
4.2.2 An example scenario
Refer to Figure 4.3 :
The number of disjoint paths n = 6 between the sender and receiver.
Number of groups ( G ) is
G = n / two or more paths in each group
G=6/2=3
The entire message M = 9.
Parts of the entire message
m=M/G
=9/3=3

where m is m1= m2 = m3

The message’s id for the entire message M is msg-id = 1.
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The message part ids for the message parts are msg-sp-id1=1, msg-sp-id2=2, and msg-spid3=3.
So, the message part id’s sum is
msg-sp-id-sum = msg-sp-id1+msg-sp-id2+msg-sp-id3
=1+2+3=6
Encrypted the message parts m1,m2,m3 using EHC at the sender before sending them to
the destination:
We have M = 9 and m1 = m2 = m3 = 9 / 3 = 3
Encryption process:
Select p=11, q=7 and r (random) = 2
Then

m=p × q=11 × 7 = 77

Ep (m1) = (m1 + r * pq) (mod m)
= (3+2*117) (mod 77)
Ep (m1) = 25
And so on for m2 and m3
Ep (m2) = 25 and Ep (m3) = 25
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Sending Ep (m1) to group G1, Ep (m2) to group G2 and Ep (m3) to group G3 along
with clear msg-id, msg-sp-id, and msg-sp-id-sum to be used to recover the entire message
at the receiver side. On the receiver side, the receiver adds up all the encrypted parts of the
entire message with the same msg-id = 1 by adding message part ids (msg-sp-id1+msg-spid2+ msg-sp-id3) using the additive property in homomorphic encryption scheme to reach
the sum of message parts msg-sp-id-sum = 6. When the received part is duplicated with
already received message part ID, then the receiver discards it.
E (m1) + E (m2) + E (m3) = 25 + 25 + 25 = 75 = Y
Decrypt the sum of the encrypted parts of the entire message to get the original message at
the receiver using EHC.
Decryption process:
Y = E (m1) + E (m2) + E (m3) = 75 and shared key p = 11
Dp (Y ) = Y mod p
= 75 mod 11 = 9 = M (The original message )
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Figure 4.3 An example of the proposed scheme where n = 6 and G = 3
In this scheme, the receiver can recover the whole message even though the data
are dropped through (n /G) -1 disjoint paths due to blackhole attacks because data is
received via another safe path available in the group. Also, the entire message cannot be
revealed to an attacker even if the node is compromised because the attacker gets only a
part of the encrypted message, not the entire message. Hence, original data is recovered
successfully.
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4.2.3 Proposed scheme

Proposed algorithm – the sender procedure
Input: message M, number of active disjoint paths n
Output: Encrypted part of message E(m)
1: Read M, n

// read the entire message and number of active
paths between source and destination.

2: Set r

// number of required disjoint active paths in each

group.
3: Set G to n / r

// G is the number of groups of disjoint paths.

4: Set m = M / G

// splitting the original message.

5: Set msg-id to 1

// assign ‘message id’ value for the whole message.

6: msg-sp-id-sum = 0

// initiate value of the sum of message parts.

7: for ( i = 1; i ≤ G ; i++)
8:

Set msg-sp-id to i

// assign ‘id’ to part of the message.

9:

Set E(m) to encrypt m

// encrypt part of the message.

10:

msg-sp-id-sum + = msg-sp-id

// add to get the sum of message split ids.

11:

Write msg-id, msg-sp-id, E(m)

// buffer output data.

12: end for
13: Write msg-sp-id-sum

// attend sum of message split ids to the

buffer of output.
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14: Send msg-id, msg-sp-id, msg-sp-id-sum,E(m)

//send output data to destination.

Proposed algorithm – the receiver procedure
Input: msg-id, msg-sp-ids, msg-sp-id-sum, encrypted message E(m)
Output: the original message M
1: Set sum = 0, E(M) = 0
2: While (sum != msg-sp-id-sum) do
3:

if ( msg-sp-id is duplicated ) then

// msg-sp-id of encrypted message is

already received.
4:
5:

drop E(m)

// drop the duplicate encrypted message.

else

6:

add E(M)=E(M)+E(m)

7:

sum = sum+ msg-sp-id

// add encrypted parts of message.
// add message split ids of the encrypted

parts.
8: end while
9: M = decrypt E(M)

// decrypt sum of the encrypted parts to get
The original Message.

Now, we analyze the time complexity of our proposed scheme. In EHC, key
generation, encryption, and decryption run in time polynomial (λ) where λ is a security
parameter specifying the bit-length of the keys. To simplify the analysis, let us assume that
one encryption time in EHC is T. Since decryption time in EHC is much smaller than
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encryption time, the encryption time dominates, and T is the execution time in EHC. The
overhead of using EHC in our proposed scheme is T × θ(G). Note that G is the number of
groups of disjoint paths, and n is the number of active disjoint paths between a sender and
a receiver.
Next, we analyze the time complexity of the sender’s procedure in our proposed
scheme. The initialization steps (1 to 5) take θ(1), respectively. Encryption steps (6 to 12)
repeat G times, so it takes T × θ(G) times. So, the computational time complexity of the
sender’s procedure is T × θ(G). The communicational time complexity in 14 is θ(G) since
the sender transmits E(m) and msg-sp-id G times. The storage for msg-sp-id and E(m)
needs θ(G) times, and the storage for msg-id and msg-sp-id-sum takes θ(1) time. The
storage for n paths is θ(n) times. Now, we analyze the time complexity of the receiver’s
procedure in our proposed scheme. The initialization step (1) takes θ(1). The addition steps
(2 to 8) take θ(G) times. The decryption time (9) takes O(T) times. So, the computational
time on the receiver’s side is smaller than that on the sender’s side. The storage requirement
n the receiver’s side is also smaller than that on the sender’s side. Therefore, the time
complexity in the sender’s side is the time complexity in our proposed scheme.
In the original AOMDV scheme, the storage requirement for n paths is θ(n). Neither
encryption nor decryption is used. So, the computational complexity is O(n). The
communicational time complexity is also O(n) in the worst case. Table 4.1 summarizes the
comparison of time complexity between our proposed scheme and the original AOMDV
scheme.
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Table 4.1 Comparison of time complexity between our proposed scheme and the original
AOMDV scheme
Scheme

Memory

Our proposed
AOMDV

Encryption

Decryption

Computation

Communication

θ(n) + θ(G) T × θ(G)

T × θ(1)

T × θ(G)

θ(n)

θ(n)

-

θ(1)

O(n)

-

4.3 Analytical Model
In this section, we analyze our proposed algorithm through numerical modeling.
When we assume that a source node has n disjoint routes to the destination, we can model
each route as a queue Qi, which has a service rate µi and arrival rate λ from the source node
as shown in figure 4.4 Since a route consists of several nodes, the buffer capacity of each
route is the sum of buffers in all nodes. Hence, we use the M/M/1 queue under the
assumption that each queue has an infinite buffer for traffic and the service discipline is
FCFS. Fig. 4.4 shows the queue model used in our analysis.

Figure 4.4 Queue model for the proposed protocol
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4.3.1 M/M/1 queue
To analyze the M/M/1 with Poisson arrivals (exponential interarrival times) and
exponential service times, we need to know only the mean arrival rate λ and the mean
service rate µ. Quantity λ/µ is called the utilization factor (traffic intensity) of the server
and is denoted by ρ. The stability condition of the queue is ρ < 1. Below is a list of
properties of M/M/1 queue.
Definition 1
Mean waiting time:

1/µ

E[w] = ρ 1− ρ

(4.1)

Definition 2
Mean response time: E[r] = (1/µ)/(1 − ρ )

(4.2)

From this model, the total expected waiting time 𝑊𝑖 in 𝑄𝑖 just for one packet is the mean
response time.
𝑊𝑖 = (1/µ)/(1 − ρ )

(4.3)

Let 𝛼𝑖 be the throughput that can be expected in 𝑄𝑖 .
𝛼𝑖 =

𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎

(4.4)

𝑊𝑖

Now, we can obtain 𝛽 the throughput of the proposed protocol during 𝑊𝑖 as follows:
𝛽 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖

(4.5)

where 𝑛 the number of active disjoint paths.
64

Each route as a queue has a service rate µ equal to 2 packets/second and arrival rate
λ equal to 1 packet/second. We assume that we have four different scenarios for our
MANET topology such as no malicious node (no packet loss), one malicious node into the
active route, two malicious nodes into two active routes and also, three malicious nodes in
the topology, respectively. Table 4.2 lists the results of the total throughput obtained from
the analytical results with those obtained from the simulation results.

4.3.2 An example scenario
λ = 1 packet/second, µ = 2 packets/second and packet size = 512 bytes. Waiting
time 𝑊1 in 𝑄1 just for one packet is the mean response time.

𝑊𝑖 = (1/µ)/(1 − ρ ) = (1/2) / (1- 0.5) = 1 sec
From our proposal, dividing the first packet for sending it into M/M/1 queues and
the capacity of each queue is one packet per second, so the source sends three packets to
utilize the whole size of the queue.
4,096 bits / 3 (# of groups) = 1,365 bits
The throughput that can be expected in a single queue such as 𝑄1 is:
𝛼1 =

𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
𝑊1

= 4096 bits/sec

The total throughput 𝛽 of all queues Q’s during 𝑊𝑖 ′𝑠 is :
𝛽 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 = ∑6𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖
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= 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 + 𝛼4 + 𝛼5 + 𝛼6 = 24, 576 bits/sec
In this case, n is the number of active disjoint paths between the source and the
destination, and there is no malicious node within any of these active paths. But in the case
of a malicious node’s presence, the throughput for a single queue is zero due to the
dropping of data by the malicious node.

Table 4.2 Comparing the throughput obtained from the analytical results with those
obtained from the simulation results

Number of malicious
nodes

Numerical results (kbps)

Simulation results
(kbps)

0

24.57

72

1

20.47

57

2

16.38

59

3

12.28

39

4

8.19

34

5

4.06

24

4.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the simulation results for performance evaluation are presented.
First, the simulation methodology and performance matrices are explained, and then the
simulation results are given.
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4.4.1 Performance methodology and performance metrics
We make a simulation using a network simulator (NS-2) [64]. The AOMDV
protocol is modified to simulate our proposed scheme with several malicious nodes. We
define 100 nodes for our simulation. Some of those nodes are simulated as blackhole nodes.
Each node in a MANET is assigned an initial position within the simulation dimensions
(1,100 × 1,100 meters). The packets are generated using CBR with packet size 512 bytes
for all mobile nodes. 10 meters per second is used as the mobility of each node. The
simulation lasted 900 seconds. We use the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol. Table 4.3 lists the
simulation parameters.
To evaluate the performance, we simulated the original AOMDV protocol and our
proposed scheme in the following four metrics as a function of the number of attackers:
Packet delivery ratio (%): the proportion of the total number of packets reached the
destination over the number of packets sent by the source.
Throughput (bits/sec): the amount of data successfully received at the destination per
second.
Packet loss (%): the average number of lost packets during the data transmission process.
Average end-to-end delay (sec): the time taken for a packet to reach the destination from
the source node.
Also, we consider node mobility scenarios to analyze the simulation results based
on the performance metrics as packet delivery ratio (%) and throughput (bits/sec).
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Table 4.3 Simulation parameters

Simulator

Network simulator
2.35

Number of nodes

100

Malicious nodes

0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Area

1,100 m × 1,100 m

Communication
range

250 m

Packet size

512 bytes

Interface type

Phy/Wireless Phy

MAC type

IEEE 802.11

Queue length

50 packets

Propagation type

TwoRayGround

Routing protocol

AOMDV

Transport agent

UDP

Application agent

CBR

Traffic rate

1 kbps

Simulation time

900 seconds
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4.4.2 Simulation results
4.4.2.1 Packet delivery ratio
Refer to Figure 4.5. Here, the packet delivery ratio (PDR) is compared between our
proposed scheme and the original AOMDV protocol as a function of malicious nodes
(blackhole attackers). When one attacker is launched into one of the active routes, PDR is
decreased in the original AOMDV scheme but there is no big impact in AOMDV when the
number of attackers is increased more than one for a single data transmission flow through
the same active route because the AOMDV scheme utilizes only a single path at a time.
Hence, the first attacker involved in the single path only will create a big impact and the
rest of the attackers will not create any significant impact since the original data is already
dropped. In the meantime, our proposed scheme maintains the PDR because the original
data is received somehow by using any one of the paths from the number of paths in the
group. Hence, the original data is recovered properly. Here, we observe that in the presence
of any malicious nodes, the packet delivery ratio reduces too much in the original
AOMDV, but it stays holding close in our proposed scheme, and more malicious nodes
give less packet delivery. As seen, our proposed method has shown good performance in
packet delivery compared to the original method.
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Figure 4.5. Impact of packet delivery ratio as a function of malicious nodes
4.4.2.2 Throughput
In Figure 4.6, we compare the throughput of schemes as a function of malicious
nodes (blackhole attackers). When an active attacker is present in the network, the amount
of data successfully received at the destination per second is decreased in both schemes
because of the long duration of data transmission. But our proposed scheme still provides
higher throughput than the original AOMDV scheme due to the high PDR when the
number of attackers is increased. Even though our proposed scheme takes more time for
delivering the packet, it is more reliable to deliver the packet when malicious nodes are
increased. Here, we observe that throughput is higher in our proposed scheme compared to
the original scheme for the packet transmission.
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Figure 4.6 Impact of throughput as a function of malicious nodes
4.4.2.3 Packet loss
The packet loss of the schemes is compared in Figure 4.7 as a function of blackhole
attackers. In general, when the number of active attackers is increased within multipath
routing protocols, packet loss is increased. In the original AOMDV protocol, there is a
slight impact on the packet loss when the attacker is increased more than one for single
data transmission because the scheme utilizes only a single path at a time. Thus, the first
attacker involved in the single path only will create a big impact and the rest of the attackers
in the same active route will not create any significant impact because the encrypted
message has already dropped by the first attack. But there is an impact of multiple attackers
in the proposed protocol because the scheme utilizes multiple paths simultaneously. Even
though the impact is present with higher data loss in our proposed scheme by increasing
the malicious modes, it delivers almost the whole packet to the destination by distributing
it into multiple paths to ensure the entire delivery through safe paths.
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Figure 4.7 Impact of packet loss as a function of malicious nodes

4.4.2.4 End-to-end delay
In Figure 4.8, we compare the end-to-end delay of both schemes as a function of
blackhole attackers. The delay is higher in our proposed scheme than the original AOMDV
scheme when the number of malicious nodes is increased due to its procedures and security
features. According to the data packet delivery ratio when the number of malicious nodes
is increased, our proposed scheme can deliver data better than other methods, but it must
divide and encrypt the message to achieve this feature. Due to this reason, it takes more
delay in delivery.
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Figure 4.8 Impact of end-to-end delay as a function of malicious nodes

4.4.2.5 The Impact of Mobility on Performance
Figure 4.9 depicts the effect of the packet delivery ratio on the node mobility in the
presence of the black hole attack in the network, where node mobility (meter per second
m/s) is the rate at which the nodes are moving in the network. We observe that AOMDV
suffers heavy loss in packets in the presence of a blackhole node, by dropping from above
30% to below 20%. However, our protocol scheme gives a higher packet delivery ratio,
not less than 75% in the node mobility 80 m/s even in the presence of a blackhole node.
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Figure 4.9 Impact of packets delivery ratio as a function of node mobility
Also, the effect of the network throughput on node mobility is depicted in Fig. 4.10.
We observe that the standard AOMDV protocol under blackhole attack has much lower
throughput when compared to that of our proposed scheme. Moreover, when an active
attacker is present and the node mobility is increased in the network, the amount of data
successfully received at the destination per second is decreased in both schemes but still,
our proposed scheme holds very high throughput compared to the original protocol.
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Figure 4.10 Impact of throughput as a function of node mobility
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed an extended AOMDV scheme to make data
transmission reliable and secure in the presence of malicious nodes in MANETs by
distributing the parts of the entire message into multiple paths and using a homomorphic
encryption method for cryptography. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme
provides a higher packet delivery ratio and throughput, which are good features for
emergency applications in MANETs. Moreover, the success rate of the proposed scheme
to ensure and guarantee the delivery of the packet to the target is very high with many
active paths in each group of the network.
Further research will be done in decreasing end-to-end delay to apply this scheme
to emergency applications in MANETs.
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CHAPTER 5

Secure Data Integrity in VANETs based on CS-DC Scheme
This chapter includes a proposal to provide a data integrity protection technique
when data is forwarding in VANETs, and to overcome any bogus data in the VANET early
to reduce communication overhead based on compressive sensing-based data collection
(CS-DC) using CS theory to compress and recover in-network relevant data. Section 1 of
this chapter defines the problem in the CS-DC scheme which is used in VANETs for data
coding/decoding, which will achieve a simple encoding process and effective decoupling
of data compression from data transmission structure. Section 2 in this chapter defines the
network model in our scheme which is based on a cluster-based aggregation structure plus
a brief scenario of the VANET model as an example. Also, it explains the disadvantage of
the CS-DC scheme used in VANETs. In section 3 of this chapter, we propose the integrated
technique into the CS-DC scheme using Hamming Code to detect and drop fake data
sooner for protecting data integrity when data is forwarding to RSU. Section 4 describes
the proposed approach in detail about its processes, data encoding, and decoding. An
example of CS-DC is listed in section 5. In section 6, the theoretical performance of CSDC and our proposed scheme is analyzed. Section 7 provides the performance parameters
of our performance evaluation and the results after the simulation. In this section, the
performance of ECDAMA and CDAMA is declared using two parameters in the presence
of the false data in the network. Finally, section 8 provides a conclusion of this chapter.
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5.1 Problem definition
In VANETs, the entire communication is an open-access environment that makes
VANETs more vulnerable to attacks [65]. Thus, the attacker can modify, intercept, inject,
and delete the messages. For example, the attacker can get access to the traffic messages,
which are used to guide the vehicles on the road. If the attacker alters these messages, it is
possible to spread false information on the road and cause traffic congestions, traffic
incidents, accidents, and hazards. In a V2V network and a V2I network, vehicles rely on
the integrity of data they receive from other vehicles and roadside units to make decisions
regarding safety messages and alerts. It is widely agreed that VANETs must rely heavily
on node-to-node communication, thus allowing for malicious data traffic [66]. One of the
used schemes to efficiently collect spatially correlated data in VANETs is CS-DC [29], it
is based on the compressive sensing (CS) theory. This scheme significantly improves the
efficiency, scalability, and reliability of data collection in VANETs but this scheme
becomes insecure in case some gateway nodes are compromised because encoding of
sensing data in the CS-DC scheme does not protect data from some attacks like false data
attack, since an adversary is still able to distribute some false information to change the
data and it may cause false alerts due to false sensing data.
5.2 System model
We define two system models. Network architecture is defined in the network
model and an attack is defined in the adversary model.
5.2.1 Network model
We assumed that each vehicle is installed with a wireless communication device
using dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) [67], a transmission rate of 6-11
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Mbps, and a communication range of 250m. Besides, each vehicle will periodically
broadcast beacons that contain its current location, speed, and heading direction of the
sender.
Figure 5.1 shows a brief scenario of this model as an example. Consider the
emergency of the safety event, where the spatially correlated data from numerous vehicles
will be collected by a dedicated RSU through multi-hop transmission. Hence, the sensing
nodes (vehicles) will broadcast their readings immediately once they detect the event. One
node out of the sensing range will be dynamically determined as the data aggregator to
collect the available readings for aggregation and propagate the aggregated data to the next
aggregator through the gateway nodes till the aggregated data reached the sink.

Figure 5.1 The network structure of VANET
Suppose there are N nodes, which are denoted as nodes N1, N1, N3, …. and Nn, and
all these nodes will transmit their data n1, n2, n3, …. and nn to the RSU with multi-hop
transmission. To improve the transmission efficiency, we know that the intuitive way to
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collect the data locally using the clustering technique, such as the clustered gathering
protocol [68].
5.2.2 Adversary model
Gateway nodes in VANETs can be compromised by adversaries due to their
distribution in the unintended environment. A compromised gateway node can be used to
launch a variety of security attacks. We assume that bogus data can be injected to VANETs
by the compromised gateway nodes and data integrity can be altered. Here, false data can
be generated and injected into the network by an adversary to persuade the base station or
sink that the received data is true. This leads to modifying the integrity of data during
transmutation in the CS-DC scheme.
5.3 The proposed scheme
We assume that the scenario of a straight highway in dense traffic, where numerous
vehicles will report their correlated data to the data sink as an RSU without any
intersections is considered. As we mentioned, the CS-DC scheme achieved high
communication efficiency and accurate data recovery but any gateway node in the VANET
environment can be compromised by adversaries due to their distribution in the unintended
environment. In our proposed scheme, we integrate a technique using Hamming code [69]
into the conventional scheme to detect and drop false data sooner for protecting data
integrity when data is forwarded, and to overcome any bogus data in the network early for
reducing the cost of communication overhead and avoiding base (RSU) deception. Adding
the integrity procedure into the cluster head to verify the integrity of encoded data before
it aggregates with its aggregated data. The procedure detects any false or changed data

79

injected in the network from any malicious gateway node before encoded data is delivered
to the sink (RSU).
The basic idea behind the verification technique is shown in Figure 5.2, after
collecting all the data from all the nodes in the cluster, then cluster head CH will encode
the data using Hamming code into another vector. Thus, only the data vector is transmitted
from the cluster to the sink through several clusters, which will greatly reduce the
communication overhead in the network. After data encoding using the Hamming code,
the CH will send the encoded data to the upstream gateway node or cluster head CH. When
data reach CH, it will verify the integrity of the received encoded data using the syndrome
for a Hamming code. If the received data is correct, then CH will aggregate it with the
current encoded data and forward it again until the sink receives it. Otherwise, it will be
dropped, and the current CH will send a reply message to the previous CH to resend the
encoded data again. At the receiver side, RSU can accurately reconstruct the data from
encoded data.

Figure 5.2 The network structure of the proposed scheme
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5.4 Data Encoding and Recovery in the Proposed Scheme
Here, the hamming code is applied for data encoding/decoding, and the data
correlation will be explored at the decoder end to accurately recover the spatially correlated
data.
5.4.1 Data Encoding
The data collection process of the proposed scheme is illustrated through the
scenario shown in Figure 5.3. In each cluster, it is assumed that there are 𝐾 nodes. As
shown in Figure 5.3, after collecting all the data, denoted by the vector 𝑑𝐾x1 =
[𝑑1 , 𝑑2 ,……., 𝑑𝐾 ]′, from all the nodes in the cluster, the CH will encode it into another
vector 𝑌𝐽x1 , where 𝐽 << 𝐾. After data encoding, the CH will send the data 𝑌𝐽x1 to the
upstream gateway node GN.

Figure 5.3 The data collection process
Thus, by using data encoding in the CH, the proposed scheme will transmit much
fewer data in the network. The transform from 𝑑𝐾x1 to 𝑌𝐽x1 is as follows:
𝑌𝐽x1 = ∅𝐽x𝐾 𝑑𝐾x1
This is:
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(5.1)

𝑦1
∅11
𝑦2
( ⋮ )=( ⋮
∅𝐽1
𝑦3

⋯
⋱
⋯

𝑑1
∅1𝐾
⋮ ) ( 𝑑2 )
⋮
∅𝐽𝐾
𝑑𝐾

(5.2)

In equation (5.1), ∅𝐽x𝐾 is a 𝐽 x 𝐾 sensing matrix and it contains the series of random
numbers and the data 𝑌𝐽x1 is transmitted to the sink, which will greatly reduce the
communication overhead in the network. In equation (5.2), 𝑑𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝐾) is a scalar
value.

5.4.2 Data Recovery
The signal 𝑑𝐾x1 can be considered as an 𝑆-sparse signal if there is a basis 𝜓 by
which 𝑑𝐾x1 can be represented by 𝑆 non-zero entries, where 𝑆 ≪ 𝐾.
That is
𝑑 = ∑𝐾
𝑖=1 𝜓𝑖 𝜃𝑖 or 𝑑 = 𝜓Θ

(5.3)

where 𝜓 = [𝜓1 ,𝜓2 ,….., 𝜓𝐾 ] and Θ = [𝜃1 , 𝜃2 ,….., 𝜃𝐾 ] is the vector of corresponding
coefficients. So, 𝑑𝐾x1 is an 𝑆-sparse signal on the basis 𝜓. Thus, according to the CS
theory, 𝑑𝐾x1 can be recovered from 𝐽 samples if
𝐽 ≥ 𝐶. 𝜇 2 (Φ, 𝜓). 𝑆. 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐾

for some positive constant 𝐶

(5.4)

In (5.4), 𝜋(𝜙, 𝜓) is the coherence between the sensing matrix 𝜙 in equation (5.1) and the
representation basis 𝜓 in equation (5.3).
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Therefore, the RSU can accurately reconstruct the data signal 𝑑𝐾𝑋1 by solving the
following 𝑙1 − 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 minimalization problem
𝑚𝑖𝑛Θ∈𝑅𝐾 ||Θ||𝑙1 , 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑌 = Φ𝑑, d = 𝜓Θ

(5.5)

Where,
(5.6)

||Θ||𝑙1 = ∑𝑖 |𝜃𝑖 |

If Θ∗ is the solution to the above convex optimization problem, the proposed
reconstruction 𝑑∗ is given by
𝑑 ∗ = 𝜓 Θ∗

(5.7)

5.5 An example of the Proposed Scheme
In our scenario, we use the Hamming code method for encoding, decoding, and
the error detection process. In this method, the redundant bits are added to the data by the
sender to encode the data.
For example, we have a 4-bit message (d) to be sent after encoding, so we have
𝑌 – 𝑑 = 3 parity check bits, where 𝑌 = 7.

Correct =

3–1
2

= 1 bit

The generator matrix 𝜑 for this code is :
𝜑 = [ 𝑃| 𝐼 ]

0
𝜑 = [ 𝑃| 𝐼 ] = [1
1
1

1
0
1
1

1
1
0
1

1
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

0
0
1
0

Data encoding

To encode the first message

𝑑1 = [0
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0 1

1]

0
0
]
0
1

From eq. (5.1), data encoding

𝑌𝐽x1 = 𝑑1x𝐾 𝜑𝐾𝑥𝑗

where operation on GF (2) = (0, 1)

𝑌1 ′ = [0

1 1

0
1
0] [
1
1

1
0
1
1

1
1
0
1

1
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
] = [1 0
0
1

1 1 0

1 0]

An error detection

To check for errors, check all the parity bits. The pattern of errors, called the error
syndrome S, identifies the bit in error. If all parity bits are correct, there is no error.
𝑠 = 𝐻𝑌 𝑇

Parity matrix H is :
1
𝐻 = [ 𝐼 | 𝑃𝑇 ] = [0
0

0 0
1 0
0 1

0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0

1
1]
1

Then,

1 0
𝑠 = 𝐻𝑌 = [0 1
0 0

0 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 1

𝑇

1
0
1 1 1
0
1 1] 1 = [0] = 0
0 1 0
0
1
[0]

Then 𝑑 is correct. Otherwise, 𝑑 has been changed. Also, encode and check 𝑑2 , 𝑑3 and 𝑑4 .

𝑑2 = [0 0

𝑌2 ′ = [ 1

1 0]

1

𝑑3 = [0 1

0

0

0

1

0]

0 0]

𝑌3 ′ = [ 1

0

𝑑4 = [ 0

1 1

𝑌4 ′ = [1

0

1

0

1 0

1

0]

1]
0 1 1 1]

Then the encoded data is listed as below:
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1
1
𝑌′ = [
1
1

0
1
0
0

1
0
1
0

1
0
1
0

0
0
0
1

1
1
1
1

0
0
]
0
1

Data Recovery

𝑑 = ∑𝐾
𝑖=1 𝜓𝑖 𝜃𝑖 or 𝑑 = 𝜓 Θ

Where 𝜓 = [𝜓1 ,𝜓2 ,….., 𝜓𝐾 ], and Θ = [𝜃1 , 𝜃2 ,….., 𝜃𝐾 ] is the vector of corresponding
coefficients. So, 𝑑𝐾x1 is an 𝑆-sparse signal on the basis 𝜓. Thus, according to the CS
theory, 𝑑𝐾x1 can be recovered from 𝐽 samples. Therefore, in the data sink, it can accurately
reconstruct the data signal 𝑑𝐾×1 by solving the following 2-norm minimization problem.
𝑒 = 𝑌 ′ − 𝑌 ==> 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃=𝑅 ||𝑒 ||22
𝑒 = 𝑌 ′ − 𝑑𝜑 where 𝑑 = 𝜓𝜃
Then, 𝑒 = 𝑌 ′ − 𝜑𝜓𝜃
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃=𝑅 || 𝑌 ′ − 𝜑𝜓𝜃 ||22
By using the Gradient-Descent method (iteration method).
𝜃 (𝐾+1) = 𝜃 (𝐾) − 𝜉∇𝜃 𝑒

𝑒 = || 𝑌 ′ − 𝜑𝜓𝜃 ||22
𝑇

′

′

= (𝑌 − 𝜑𝜓𝜃 ) (𝑌 − 𝜑𝜓𝜃 )
𝑇

𝑇

𝑇 𝑇

𝑇 𝑇

= 𝑌′ 𝑌′ − 𝑌′ 𝜑𝜓𝜃 − φ𝑇 𝜓 𝜃 𝑌′ + φ𝑇 𝜓 𝜃 𝜑𝜓𝜃
𝑇

𝑇

𝑇 𝑇
′
′
∇𝜃 𝑒 = 𝜕𝑒⁄𝜕𝜃 = 0 − 𝑌 𝜑𝜓 − 𝑌 𝜑𝜓 + 2 𝜃 𝜓 𝜓𝜑φ𝑇

For

𝑘 = 1,2,3, … .. 𝑘𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝
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′𝑇

(𝐾 ) 𝑇

𝜃 (𝐾+1) = 𝜃 (𝐾) 𝜃 𝜃 − 𝜉(: 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 − 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) (2𝑌 𝜑𝜓 + 2𝜃
𝜃 (𝐾) || 𝜖: stopping criteria

) where ||𝜃 (𝐾+1) −

e

If Θ∗ is the solution to the above convex optimization problem, the proposed
reconstruction 𝑑∗ is given by
𝑑 ∗ = 𝜓Θ∗

5.6 Performance Analysis of CS-DC and Proposed Scheme
Because of the implementation of CS, CS-DC will significantly reduce the
communication overhead and improve the reliability of data collection. Here, the
theoretical performance of the communication overhead and data delivery ratio will be
analyzed to investigate the benefit of CS-DC and our proposal.
5.6.1 Communication Overhead
The analysis of communication overhead is to measure how much data need to be
sent in the network by all the nodes. Here, the communication overhead is measured by
the data packet transmitted in the network, from all the sources to the data sink.
It is assumed that there are 𝑁 nodes as the data sources which will report their data
to the data sink. When applying the CS data encoding at each CH, the data collection in
the structure of cluster with CS as shown in Figure 5.4. When using a cluster structure,
each cluster head will collect the source data in the cluster and send the collected data to
the sink by an intermediate gateway node and cluster head. Thus, each CH just needs to
send the compressed data to the sink. We define 𝐾 as the number of nodes in each cluster.
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So, there are 𝑁⁄𝐾 clusters reporting the data to the data sink and 𝜌 is the compression ratio
of CS for each compression as shown in Figure 5.5.
Assume the number of retransmissions in our proposed approach is uniformly
distributed over ⌈𝑁max /2⌉. Then, the average expected number of data transmitted in the
presence of any malicious gateway node is :
𝑁

𝐾

2𝐾

𝐾

𝜌

𝜌

(𝐾 − 1). + 2. [ +

+

3𝐾
𝜌

𝑁

𝐾

𝑁

𝑁 (𝑁+ 𝜌𝐾−𝜌)

𝐾

𝜌

𝜌

𝐾𝜌

+ ⋯ + ( − 1) . ] + = (

)+

𝐾

(5.8)

(2. ) ⌈𝑁max /2⌉
𝜌

Figure 5.5 Data collection scenario

5.6.2 Data Delivery Ratio
To analyze how reliable the data from each data source can be successfully
delivered to the sink. The data delivery ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of source
data packets received in the data sink (or data center) to the number of source data packets
sent by all the source nodes. In the network, the data collisions in each cluster can be
ignored. Thus, only the data delivery ratio (DDR) for the inter-cluster communication in
these two structures, 𝐷𝐷𝑅 with CS and 𝐷𝐷𝑅 ′ with our proposal, will be analyzed.
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𝑁

From Figure 5.5, we can see that there are 2 ( 𝐾 − 1) communication hops from
the furthest CH to the nearest CH. For the structure of the cluster, the probability of noncollision in the ith hop, 𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 , will be first analyzed.
Let 𝛾 is the probability that a node transmits in an arbitrary time slot. Considering
there are 𝐾 nodes in one cluster, the probability that no node broadcasts its data at the
current slot is
𝑝1 = (1 − 𝛾 )𝐾

(5.9)

Also, when there is only one node transmitting data, there is no data collision either.
Thus, the probability that there is only one node is transmitting at the current slot is
𝑝2 = 𝐾𝛾 (1 − 𝛾)𝑘−1

(5.10)

Therefore, the probability that there is no data collision at the current slot is
𝑝3 = 𝑝1+ 𝑝2 = ( 1 − 𝛾)𝐾 + 𝐾𝛾 (1 − 𝛾 )𝐾−1
Assuming the data transmitted in a one-time slot is 𝜌𝐿0 bits, the number of time
slots needed in the ith hop is
𝑁𝑡 =

𝑖
2

⌈ ⌉ 𝐾𝐿𝑝

(5.11)

𝜌𝐿0

where 𝐿𝑝 is the data packet length in a bit.
Thus, the probability of non-collision in the ith hop for the structure of cluster CS, 𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 , is
𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 = (𝑝3 )𝑁𝑡 = [(1 − 𝑟)𝐾 + 𝐾𝑟(1 − 𝑟)𝐾−1 ]

𝑖
⌈ ⌉ 𝐾𝐿𝑝
2
𝜌𝐿0

(5.12)

Then, the probability of non-failure transmission in the ith hop for the structure of cluster
CS, 𝑝𝑛𝑓𝑖 , will be analyzed based on the analysis bit error rate as follows:
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Let the channel bit error 𝑝𝑒 be uniformly distributed with error events being independent
of each other, so the probability of non-failure transmission in the ith hop, 𝑝𝑛𝑓𝑖 , is

𝑝𝑛𝑓𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝𝑒 )

𝑖
⌈ ⌉ 𝐾𝐿𝑝
2
𝜌

(5.13)

Therefore, based on equations (5.12) and (5.13), the data delivery ratio (DDR) for the
structure of cluster with CS is
𝑁
𝐾

2( −1)+1

𝐷𝐷𝑅 = ∏𝑖=1

( 𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 . 𝑝𝑛𝑓𝑖 )](1 − 𝑝𝑓 )

(5.14)

5.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the simulation results for performance evaluation are presented.
First, the simulation methodology and performance matrices are explained, and then the
simulation results are given.
5.7.1 Simulation methodology and performance metrics
The simulation experiments are conducted using two data transmission schemes
as in the data transmission structures of CD-DC and our proposed scheme. The following
metrics are applied to compare the performance.
Data delivery ratio: the ratio of the number of data packets received in the data sink to the
number of data packets sent by all the source nodes.
Communication overhead: the number of data packets transmitted by all the nodes in
the network.
The parameters of the simulation are shown in Table 5.1. Our simulation models a straight
12 km long one-direction highway with four lanes. The average vehicle density on the
highway is varied from 15~60 vehicles/km. The average speed of the vehicles is 60 km/h.
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To evaluate the performance with different data sending rate, the nodes will generate the
packets at the rate of 0.01-0.1 packet/s. The communication radio range is set to 250 m.
The MAC protocol is 802.11with a data rate of 1 Mbps. The propagation model
implemented in our simulation is the TwoRayGround model, and the simulation duration
is 1,000 sec. The topology of VANET simulation is shown in Figure 5.6.

Table 5.1 Simulation parameters
Parameter
Road length
Vehicle density
Average speed
Data sending rate
Number of lanes
MAC layer
Data rate
Propagation model
Simulation time

Value
12 Km
15 to 60 vehicles/km
60 km/h
0.01 – 0.1 packets/sec
4
IEEE 802.11
1 Mbps
Two-Ray-Ground
1,000 sec

Figure 5.6 The topology of VANET simulation
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5.7.2 Simulation results
5.7.2.1 The impact of a malicious gateway node
The performance of both the CS-DC scheme and our proposed scheme is evaluated.
Therefore, the proposed scheme performance by varying malicious gateway nodes is
studied here.
5.7.2.1.1 Packet delivery ratio
Figure 5.7 shows the data delivery ratio for both schemes, CS-DC, and the proposed
scheme, in different malicious node scenarios. The simulation results indicate that both
schemes can achieve a high packet delivery ratio in the presence of malicious gateway
nodes, but when more false data are injected into the network by malicious gateway nodes,
then the delivered data will decrease gradually in CS-DC due to extra false data injected
into source data that cause data collision. In our proposed scheme, it is clear that the packet
delivery ratio will remain stable even when malicious gateway nodes are increased because
any false data injected will be dropped quickly after the data integrity verification process.
From the simulation results, we notice that our proposed scheme is safer and more reliable
for data integrity in the presence of malicious nodes.
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Figure 5.7 The data delivery ratio in varying malicious gateway node
5.7.2.1.2 Communication overhead
The communication overhead is measured by the data transmitted in the network,
from all the sources to the data sink. Figure 5.8 shows the communication overhead for
both schemes CS-DC and the proposed scheme in varying malicious gateway nodes. In the
CS-DC scheme, it is known that by using the clustering technique with CS theory, the
cluster head CH will gather the data in one cluster and forward the gathering data to the
RSU by multi-hop transmissions to ensure less or limited communication overhead when
the data increases. However, in the presence of malicious gateway nodes, the
communication overhead will be increased clearly when the malicious nodes increase.
Meanwhile, the proposed scheme will achieve less communication overhead compared to
the original scheme due to the data integrity check process that drops any false data
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injected. Therefore, our proposed scheme achieves better efficiency in terms of
communication overhead.

Figure 5.8 shows the communication overhead in varying malicious gateway node

5.7.2.2 The impact of the data sending rate
The network needs to transmit data packets as many as possible to achieve high
throughput and network capacity. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the network
performance by varying the data sending rate in the existence of some malicious nodes.

5.7.2.2.1 Packet delivery ratio
Figure 5.9 shows the data delivery ratio for both schemes when the data sending
rate is verified from 0.01 to 0.1 packet/sec and the presence of 3 malicious gateway nodes.
When the data sending rate is increasing, the network traffic will increase linearly, so the
data delivery ratio will decrease for both schemes. For CS-DC, there are more data
93

collisions than that of the proposed scheme due to false data as additional data. Therefore,
the data delivery ratio in CS-DC decreases faster than that in the proposed scheme when
the data sending rate increases.
.

Figure 5.9 Data delivery ratio in varying data sending rate

5.7.2.2.2 Communication overhead
Figure 5.10 shows the communication overhead for both schemes when the data
sending rate is verified from 0.01 to 0.1 packet/sec. When the data sending rate increases
linearly, the communication overhead for both schemes will increase gradually as well.
However, much more data will be sent by the CS-DC scheme. Thus, the performance of
communication overhead for the proposed scheme is greatly exceeded that of CS-DC.
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Based on the simulations above, it is clear that the performance of the proposed
scheme can exceed CS-DC when the data sending rate increases. That is, the proposed
scheme will achieve high throughput and network capacity in VANETs.

Figure 5.10 Communication overhead with a varying data sending rate

5.7 Conclusion
In VANETs, the compromised gateway nodes can be utilized to attack the data
transmission from the vehicles to the other vehicles or infrastructure units. This kind of
attack will impact on the integrity of transmitted data. According to the simulation results
of our proposal scheme which is integrated into the CS-DC scheme, this proposed scheme
is safe and reliable for data integrity in the presence of malicious gateway nodes. Also, it
achieves less communication overhead compared to the CS-DC scheme due to the data
integrity check process that drops any false data quickly before it is forwarded to the
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roadside unit. Then, the proposed scheme will be a good choice to secure the transmission
data and to reduce the communication overhead in the VANETs.
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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion and Future Work
The wireless ad hoc network, which is known as infrastructure-less networks, has
no centralized access points. Thus, the information is exchanged among authorized users,
but this process is vulnerable to various malicious threats owing to the broadcast nature of
the wireless medium. The security requirements of wireless networks are specified to
protect the wireless transmissions against wireless attacks, such as black or gray attack,
eavesdropping attack, DoS attack, data integrity attack, and so on. In general, protecting
wireless ad hoc networks should satisfy security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Our concern in this dissertation is the security requirement of
data integrity because nowadays, a significant amount of data is exchanged every second
over the internet multimedia, non-secured channel, which may not be safe. Therefore, to
keep an acceptable level of performance and security, data transmission mechanisms in
wireless networks must be designed in a way to provide reliable and secure data
transmission under possible attacks.
This dissertation proposed effective protective mechanisms for the wireless ad hoc
networks to provide data integrity protection and guarantee reliable and secure data
transmission in the presence of malicious intermediate nodes that drop or inject false data.
First, an additional security procedure is proposed on the CDAMA scheme which
aggregates data in WSNs from a multi-application environment and delivers them to the
base station individually. This procedure detects any false data during the data forwarding
and aggregation process earlier to eliminate it and reduce the overhead in the WSN.
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Second, a scheme is proposed based on the AOMDV protocol to provide secure data
transmission in MANETs against blackhole attacks using EHC. Third, another scheme is
proposed to integrate the Hamming code into the CS-DC scheme which is the first scheme
that utilizes the compressive sensing theory for large-area data collection in VANETs. This
technique detects and drops false data sooner for protecting data integrity and reducing
data overhead when data is forwarded to the base station in VANETs. From the
performance analysis of our proposed schemes, we notice that there are good features in
these proposed schemes and the success rate for all of them is very high. Clearly, they are
more ensure and reliable for securing data integrity in wireless ad hoc networks in the
existence of malicious nodes. Also, the proposed schemes achieved less communication
overhead compared to the original schemes.
Future improvements should be done on these schemes to approve all security
requirements and defend all attacks against wireless ad hoc networks. Another area of
improvement is reducing the delay in the processing time in the proposed schemes.
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APPENDIX A
TCL Script for the data integrity scheme in WSN
/*
Scenario for test-CDAMA params: result:
*/
#include <iostream>
#include "ns3/cdama_scheme.h"
#include "ns3/lte-helper.h"
#include "ns3/epc-helper.h"
#include "ns3/core-module.h"
#include "ns3/network-module.h"
#include "ns3/ipv4-global-routing-helper.h"
#include "ns3/internet-module.h"
#include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
#include "ns3/lte-module.h"
#include "ns3/applications-module.h"
#include "ns3/point-to-point-helper.h"
#include "ns3/config-store.h"
#include <ns3/flow-monitor-module.h>
#include <ns3/netanim-module.h>
#include <ns3/wifi-module.h>
#include "ns3/cdama-sink-helper.h"
#include "ns3/cdama-sink.h"
#include "ns3/gnuplot.h"
#include <fstream>
using namespace ns3;
NS_LOG_COMPONENT_DEFINE ("WifiExample");
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
/* define global parameters for simulation */
double simTime = 200.0;
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int numApp_type = 2; //the number of type of application
int numRooms = 3;//the number of rooms in a Cluster
int numSensors = 60; // the number of sensor nodes
int numClusters = numSensors/numApp_type/numRooms; // the number of clusters (groups)
int numRoutes = 1+numRooms;//the number of routes in a cluster
int numAggregators = numRoutes*numClusters + 1;
int range_x = 100;
int range_y = 100;
int Tmax = 128;
uint16_t T = 3;
uint16_t H = numSensors;
double ratio_A_B = 2; //alpah/beta
ResultCollection resultCollection;
resultCollection.numMacComputation = 0;
resultCollection.txBytes = 0;
std::cout<<"Preparing Simulation\n";
/*define nodes*/
NodeContainer bs_node, aggregator_nodes, sensor_nodes;
NetDeviceContainer bs_dev, aggregator_devs, sensor_devs;

//create nodes
bs_node.Create(1);
aggregator_nodes.Create(numAggregators);
sensor_nodes.Create(numSensors);
WifiHelper wifiHelper;
WifiMacHelper wifimacHelper;
YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhyHelper = YansWifiPhyHelper::Default();
YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannelHelper = YansWifiChannelHelper::Default();
Ssid ssid = Ssid ("sensor-room");
wifiHelper.SetRemoteStationManager ("ns3::ArfWifiManager");
wifimacHelper.SetType ("ns3::StaWifiMac",
"Ssid", SsidValue (ssid));
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wifiPhyHelper.Set ("ShortGuardEnabled", BooleanValue (0));
wifiPhyHelper.SetChannel (wifiChannelHelper.Create ());
wifiPhyHelper.Set ("EnergyDetectionThreshold", DoubleValue (-110.0) );
wifiPhyHelper.Set ("CcaMode1Threshold", DoubleValue (-110.0) );
wifiPhyHelper.Set ("TxPowerStart", DoubleValue (15.0) );
wifiPhyHelper.Set ("TxPowerEnd", DoubleValue (15.0) );
wifiPhyHelper.Set ("RxNoiseFigure", DoubleValue (7) );
//create sensor network devices
sensor_devs = wifiHelper.Install (wifiPhyHelper, wifimacHelper, sensor_nodes);
//create aggregator network devices
aggregator_devs = wifiHelper.Install(wifiPhyHelper, wifimacHelper, aggregator_nodes);
wifimacHelper.SetType("ns3::ApWifiMac", "Ssid", SsidValue(ssid));
//create bs network device
bs_dev = wifiHelper.Install(wifiPhyHelper, wifimacHelper, bs_node);
//set mobility
MobilityHelper mobilityHelper;
Ptr<ListPositionAllocator> positionAlloc = CreateObject<ListPositionAllocator> ();
mobilityHelper.SetMobilityModel ("ns3::ConstantPositionMobilityModel");
int widthCluster = (range_x-20) / numClusters;
//Set position for APs
positionAlloc->Add (Vector (range_x/2, 0.0, 0.0));
//Set position for Aggregators
positionAlloc->Add(Vector(range_x/2, range_y/4, 0.0));
for(int i = 0; i < numClusters; i++)
{
double x = 10 + i*widthCluster +widthCluster/2;
double y = range_y /2;
positionAlloc->Add(Vector(x, y, 0.0));
for(int j = 1; j <= numRooms ; j++)
{

x = (j < (double)numRooms/2) ? 10 + i*widthCluster + widthCluster/2-10*j :
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10 + i*widthCluster +widthCluster/2 + 10*(numRooms-j);
y = range_y*3/4 - 10;
positionAlloc->Add(Vector(x, y, 0));
}
}
//Set position for sensor nodes
for(int i = 0; i<numClusters; i++)
{
for(int j = 1; j<=numRooms; j++)
{
for(int k=0; k<numApp_type; k++)
{
double x = (j < (double)numRooms/2) ? 10 + i*widthCluster +

widthCluster/2-10*j : 10 + i*widthCluster +widthCluster/2 + 10*(numRoomsj);

(k < (double)numApp_type/2) ? x -= 2*(k+1) : x+= 2*(k+1);
double y = range_y*9/10;
positionAlloc->Add(Vector(x, y, 0.0));
}
}
}
mobilityHelper.SetPositionAllocator(positionAlloc);
mobilityHelper.Install(bs_node);
mobilityHelper.Install(aggregator_nodes);
mobilityHelper.Install(sensor_nodes);
//create animation xml file
AnimationInterface netAnim("test-cdama.xml");
netAnim.SetMaxPktsPerTraceFile(400000000);
netAnim.UpdateNodeColor(0, 255, 255, 255);
netAnim.UpdateNodeSize(0, 10, 10);
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netAnim.UpdateNodeDescription(bs_node.Get(0), std::string("BS"));
for(int i = 0; i<numAggregators; i++)
{
netAnim.UpdateNodeColor(aggregator_nodes.Get(i), 0, 0, 255);
netAnim.UpdateNodeSize(aggregator_nodes.Get(i)->GetId(), 5, 5);
netAnim.UpdateNodeDescription(aggregator_nodes.Get(i), std::string("A"));
}
for(int i= 0; i<numSensors; i++)
{
netAnim.UpdateNodeColor(sensor_nodes.Get(i),255,255,255);
netAnim.UpdateNodeSize(sensor_nodes.Get(i)->GetId(), 1, 1);
netAnim.UpdateNodeDescription(sensor_nodes.Get(i), std::string("S"));
}
//Install Inernet Stack
InternetStackHelper stack;
Ipv4InterfaceContainer bs_Interface, aggregator_Interface, neghiboring_Interface,
monitoring_Interface, forwarding_Interface,sensor_Interface;
stack.Install (bs_node);
stack.Install(aggregator_nodes);
stack.Install(sensor_nodes);

//Assign IP Address
Ipv4AddressHelper address;
address.SetBase("150.150.0.0", "255.255.0.0");
bs_Interface = address.Assign(bs_dev);
aggregator_Interface = address.Assign(aggregator_devs);
sensor_Interface = address.Assign(sensor_devs);
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------//Construct Cryption Module
Cdama_Scheme* crypt_module = new Cdama_Scheme(5, Tmax, numRooms, numApp_type);
crypt_module->Keygen();
Public_Key public_key1 = crypt_module->getPublicKey(1);
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//std::cout<<"n="<<public_key1.n<<" P="<<public_key1.P.toString()<<"\n";
//std::cout<<"H="<<public_key1.H.toString()<<"\n";
Public_Key public_key2 = crypt_module->getPublicKey(2);
//std::cout<<" Q="<<public_key2.P.toString()<<"\n";
Encrypt_Decrypt* pEcc = crypt_module->getECC();
//std::cout<<"pECC.a="<<pEcc->a<<" pECC.b="<<pEcc->b<<" pECC.p="<<pEcc->p<<"\n";
//-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------//Install application
ApplicationContainer bs_app, aggregator_apps,sensor_apps;
CdamaSinkHelper bsAppHelper(BS_APP, 1000);
bsAppHelper.SetPublicKey(public_key1);
bsAppHelper.SetAttribute("T", UintegerValue(T));
bsAppHelper.SetAttribute("H", UintegerValue(H));
bsAppHelper.SetAttribute("Ratio_A_B", DoubleValue(ratio_A_B));
bsAppHelper.SetResultCollection(&resultCollection);
bsAppHelper.AddPublicKey(public_key2);
bsAppHelper.SetECC(pEcc);
bs_app = bsAppHelper.Install(bs_node);
bs_app.Start (Seconds (0.0));
bs_app.Stop (Seconds (simTime + 1));
CdamaSinkHelper aggAppHelper(AGGREGTOR_APP, 1000);
aggAppHelper.SetAttribute("T", UintegerValue(T));
aggAppHelper.SetAttribute("H", UintegerValue(H));
aggAppHelper.SetAttribute("Ratio_A_B", DoubleValue(ratio_A_B));
aggAppHelper.SetResultCollection(&resultCollection);
AddressValue bsAddress (InetSocketAddress (bs_Interface.GetAddress (0), 1000));
aggAppHelper.SetAttribute ("DestAddress", bsAddress);
aggAppHelper.SetPublicKey(public_key1);
aggAppHelper.SetECC(pEcc);
ApplicationContainer firstAgg = aggAppHelper.Install(aggregator_nodes.Get(0));
aggregator_apps.Add(firstAgg);
AddressValue firstAggAddress (InetSocketAddress (aggregator_Interface.GetAddress (0), 1000));
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for(int i=0; i < numClusters; i++)
{
aggAppHelper.SetAttribute("DestAddress", firstAggAddress);
ApplicationContainer agg_app = aggAppHelper.Install(aggregator_nodes.Get(i+1));
aggregator_apps.Add(agg_app);
AddressValue secondAggAddress (InetSocketAddress (aggregator_Interface.GetAddress
(i+1), 1000));
for(int j = 1; j <= numRooms; j++)
{

aggAppHelper.SetAttribute("DestAddress", secondAggAddress);
ApplicationContainer app =
aggAppHelper.Install(aggregator_nodes.Get(i*numRooms+numClusters+j));
aggregator_apps.Add(app);
}
}
aggregator_apps.Start (Seconds (0.0));
aggregator_apps.Stop (Seconds (simTime + 1));
CdamaSinkHelper sensorAppHelper(SENSOR_APP, 1000);
sensorAppHelper.SetAttribute("Interval", TimeValue (Time ("0.1")));
sensorAppHelper.SetECC(pEcc);
sensorAppHelper.SetAttribute("T", UintegerValue(T));
sensorAppHelper.SetAttribute("H", UintegerValue(H));
sensorAppHelper.SetAttribute("Ratio_A_B", DoubleValue(ratio_A_B));
sensorAppHelper.SetResultCollection(&resultCollection);
int dest_agg_id = numClusters+1;
int sensor_id = 0;
for(int i = 0; i < numClusters; i++)
{
for(int j=0; j<numRooms; j++)
{
AddressValue destAggAddress (InetSocketAddress (aggregator_Interface.GetAddress
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(dest_agg_id), 1000));
sensorAppHelper.SetAttribute("DestAddress", destAggAddress);
for(int k = 0; k < numApp_type; k++)
{
if(k%2==0)
sensorAppHelper.SetPublicKey(public_key1);
else
sensorAppHelper.SetPublicKey(public_key2);
ApplicationContainer sensorApp =
sensorAppHelper.Install(sensor_nodes.Get(sensor_id));
sensor_apps.Add(sensorApp);
sensor_id++;
}
dest_agg_id++;
}
}
sensor_apps.Start (Seconds (1.0));
sensor_apps.Stop (Seconds (simTime + 1));
Simulator::Stop(Seconds(simTime));
std::cout<<"Start Simulation\n";
Simulator::Run();
//collect result from simulation
ofstream* os = new ofstream();
os->open("result-cdama.csv");
std::cout<<"T="<<T<<"\n";
std::cout<<"ratio_A_B="<<ratio_A_B<<"\n";
std::cout<<"totalNumberOfMacComputation ="
<<resultCollection.numMacComputation<<"\n";
std::cout<<"totalTxBytes="<<resultCollection.txBytes<<"\n";
*os<<"T="<<T<<"\n";
*os<<"ratio_A_B="<<ratio_A_B<<"\n";
*os<<"totalNumberOfMacComputation ="<<resultCollection.numMacComputation<<"\n";

107

*os<<"totalTxBytes="<<resultCollection.txBytes<<"\n";
os->close();
Simulator::Destroy();
}

APPENDIX B
TCL Script for the data integrity scheme in VANET
#include <iostream>
#include <fstream>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include "ns3/core-module.h"
#include "ns3/network-module.h"
#include "ns3/mobility-module.h"
#include "ns3/config-store-module.h"
#include "ns3/energy-module.h"
#include "ns3/internet-module.h"
#include "ns3/yans-wifi-helper.h"
#include "ns3/wifi-radio-energy-model-helper.h"
#include "ns3/netanim-module.h"
#include "ns3/applications-module.h"
#include "ns3/aodv-helper.h"
#include "ns3/flow-monitor-module.h"
#include "ns3/ipv4-flow-probe.h"
#include <unistd.h>
using namespace ns3;
NS_LOG_COMPONENT_DEFINE("Vehicle Adhoc Network");
double m_LoadLength = 6000;
double m_LaneDistance = 200;
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double m_MinSpeed = 10000 / 3600.0; // m/s
double m_MaxSpeed = 110000 / 3600.0;
static void CourseChangeCallback()
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < NodeList::GetNNodes(); i++)
{
Ptr<Node> m_Node = NodeList::GetNode(i);
Ptr<ConstantVelocityMobilityModel> m_Mobility = m_Node>GetObject<ConstantVelocityMobilityModel>();
Vector position = m_Mobility->GetPosition();
if (position.x > m_LoadLength)
{
m_Mobility->SetVelocity(Vector(0, 0, 0));
}
}
Simulator::Schedule(Seconds(1.0), &CourseChangeCallback);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
LogComponentEnable("Vehicle Adhoc Network", LogLevel(LOG_PREFIX_TIME |
LOG_PREFIX_NODE | LOG_LEVEL_INFO));
uint32_t m_NumLanes = 4;
uint32_t m_VehiclesPerKilometer = 20;
uint32_t m_PacketSize = 128;
uint32_t numPackets = 10000;
uint32_t m_NumMaliciousVehicles = 8;

double m_NumPacketsPerSecond = 0.1;
double pow = 23; //dBm for 250m
double simTime = 1000.0;
CommandLine cmd;
cmd.AddValue("PacketSize", "size of application packet sent", m_PacketSize);
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cmd.AddValue("numPackets", "Total number of packets to send", numPackets);
cmd.AddValue("NodesPerKilometer", "Number of Vehicles in Network", m_VehiclesPerKilometer);
cmd.AddValue("NumMaliciousNodes", "Number of Vehicles in Network",
m_NumMaliciousVehicles);
cmd.AddValue("NumPacketsPerSecond", "Number of Vehicles in Network",
m_NumPacketsPerSecond);
cmd.Parse(argc, argv);
uint32_t m_NumberOfVehicles = m_LoadLength / 1000 * m_VehiclesPerKilometer;
uint32_t m_MaliciousNodeIndex = m_NumberOfVehicles / m_NumMaliciousVehicles;
double m_PacketInterval = 1.0 / m_NumPacketsPerSecond;
LogComponentEnable("PacketSink", LOG_INFO);
// LogComponentEnable("UdpClient", LOG_INFO);
char buf[255] = {0};
memset(buf, 0, 255);
sprintf(buf, "DsssRate%dMbps", 2);
std::string phyMode(buf);
Config::SetDefault("ns3::WifiRemoteStationManager::FragmentationThreshold",
StringValue("2200"));
Config::SetDefault("ns3::WifiRemoteStationManager::RtsCtsThreshold",
StringValue("2200"));
Config::SetDefault("ns3::WifiRemoteStationManager::NonUnicastMode",
StringValue(phyMode));
NodeContainer totalNodes, vehicleNodes, rsuNodes;
rsuNodes.Create(1);
vehicleNodes.Create(m_NumberOfVehicles);
totalNodes.Add(rsuNodes);
totalNodes.Add(vehicleNodes);
WifiHelper wifi;
wifi.SetStandard(WIFI_PHY_STANDARD_80211b);
YansWifiPhyHelper wifiPhy = YansWifiPhyHelper::Default();
wifiPhy.Set("TxPowerStart", DoubleValue(pow)); // dBm
wifiPhy.Set("TxPowerEnd", DoubleValue(pow));
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YansWifiChannelHelper wifiChannel;
wifiChannel.SetPropagationDelay("ns3::ConstantSpeedPropagationDelayModel");
wifiChannel.AddPropagationLoss("ns3::TwoRayGroundPropagationLossModel");
Ptr<YansWifiChannel> wifiChannelPtr = wifiChannel.Create();
wifiPhy.SetChannel(wifiChannelPtr);
WifiMacHelper wifiMac;
wifi.SetRemoteStationManager("ns3::ConstantRateWifiManager", "DataMode",

StringValue(phyMode), "ControlMode",
StringValue(phyMode));
wifiMac.SetType("ns3::AdhocWifiMac");
NetDeviceContainer devices = wifi.Install(wifiPhy, wifiMac, totalNodes);
MobilityHelper mobility;
mobility.SetMobilityModel("ns3::ConstantVelocityMobilityModel");
mobility.Install(totalNodes);
Ptr<UniformRandomVariable> m_rand = CreateObject<UniformRandomVariable>();
double m_LanePos = m_LoadLength / 2 - m_LaneDistance * (m_NumLanes / 2.0 - 0.5);
rsuNodes.Get(0)->GetObject<MobilityModel>()->SetPosition(Vector(m_LoadLength, m_LanePos,
0));
rsuNodes.Get(0)->GetObject<ConstantVelocityMobilityModel>()->SetVelocity(Vector(0, 0, 0));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < vehicleNodes.GetN(); i++)
{
vehicleNodes.Get(i)->GetObject<MobilityModel>()->SetPosition(Vector(0, m_LanePos +
m_LaneDistance * (i % m_NumLanes), 0));
vehicleNodes.Get(i)->GetObject<ConstantVelocityMobilityModel>()->SetVelocity(Vector(m_rand>GetValue(m_MinSpeed, m_MaxSpeed), 0, 0));
}
InternetStackHelper internet;
internet.Install(totalNodes);
Ipv4AddressHelper ipv4;
ipv4.SetBase("150.150.0.0", "255.255.0.0");
Ipv4InterfaceContainer i = ipv4.Assign(devices);
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NodeContainer headerNodes, maliciousNodes, normalNodes;
Simulator::Schedule(Seconds(1.0), &CourseChangeCallback);
AnimationInterface anim("vanet-network.xml");
memset(buf, 0, 255);
getcwd(buf, 255);
uint32_t m_RsuImageId = anim.AddResource(std::string(buf) + std::string("/images/rsu.png"));

uint32_t m_NormalCarImageId = anim.AddResource(std::string(buf) + std::string("/images/normalcar.png"));

uint32_t m_HeaderCarImageId = anim.AddResource(std::string(buf) + std::string("/images/headercar.png"));

uint32_t m_MaliciousCarImageId = anim.AddResource(std::string(buf) +
std::string("/images/malicious-car.png"));
double m_xScale = m_LoadLength / 1920.0;
double m_yScale = m_LoadLength / 889.0;
anim.SetBackgroundImage(std::string(buf) + std::string("/images/HW.jpg"), 0, 0, m_xScale, m_yScale,
0.5);
anim.SetMaxPktsPerTraceFile(4294967295u);
anim.UpdateNodeImage(rsuNodes.Get(0)->GetId(), m_RsuImageId);
anim.UpdateNodeSize(rsuNodes.Get(0)->GetId(), 500, 500);

for (uint32_t i = 0; i < vehicleNodes.GetN(); i++)
{
if (i > 0 && i % m_MaliciousNodeIndex == 0)
{
anim.UpdateNodeImage(vehicleNodes.Get(i)->GetId(), m_MaliciousCarImageId);
maliciousNodes.Add(vehicleNodes.Get(i));
}
else
{
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if (m_rand->GetValue(0, 1) > 0.95)
{
anim.UpdateNodeImage(vehicleNodes.Get(i)->GetId(), m_HeaderCarImageId);
headerNodes.Add(vehicleNodes.Get(i));
}
else
{
anim.UpdateNodeImage(vehicleNodes.Get(i)->GetId(), m_NormalCarImageId);
normalNodes.Add(vehicleNodes.Get(i));
}
}
anim.UpdateNodeSize(vehicleNodes.Get(i)->GetId(), 150, 150);
}
ApplicationContainer sinkApp;
uint16_t port = 9;
PacketSinkHelper sinkAppHelper("ns3::UdpSocketFactory",
InetSocketAddress(Ipv4Address::GetAny(), port));
sinkApp = sinkAppHelper.Install(rsuNodes);
sinkApp.Start(Seconds(0.0));
sinkApp.Stop(Seconds(simTime));
Ipv4Address remoteAddr = rsuNodes.Get(0)->GetObject<Ipv4>()->GetAddress(1, 0).GetLocal();
UdpClientHelper clientHelper(remoteAddr, port);
clientHelper.SetAttribute("Interval", TimeValue(Seconds(m_PacketInterval)));
clientHelper.SetAttribute("MaxPackets", UintegerValue(numPackets));
clientHelper.SetAttribute("PacketSize", UintegerValue(m_PacketSize));
ApplicationContainer clientApps = clientHelper.Install(normalNodes);
clientApps.Start(Seconds(0));
clientApps.Stop(Seconds(simTime));
FlowMonitorHelper flowmon;
Ptr<FlowMonitor> monitor = flowmon.InstallAll();
Simulator::Stop(Seconds(simTime + 1));
Simulator::Run();
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Ptr<Ipv4FlowClassifier> classifier = DynamicCast<Ipv4FlowClassifier>(flowmon.GetClassifier());
std::map<FlowId, FlowMonitor::FlowStats> stats = monitor->GetFlowStats();
uint32_t m_TxPackets = 0, m_TxDataSize = 0, m_RxPackets = 0, m_RxDataSize = 0, m_count = 0;
double m_ThroughPut = 0.0, m_DelayTime = 0.0, m_JitterTime = 0.0;
for (std::map<FlowId, FlowMonitor::FlowStats>::iterator it = stats.begin(); it != stats.end(); it++)
{
if (it->second.rxPackets > 1)
{

m_TxPackets += it->second.txPackets;
m_TxDataSize += it->second.txBytes;
m_RxPackets += it->second.rxPackets;
m_RxDataSize += it->second.rxBytes;
m_DelayTime += it->second.delaySum.GetSeconds() / (it->second.rxPackets);
m_JitterTime += it->second.jitterSum.GetSeconds() / (it->second.rxPackets - 1);
m_count++;
}
}
m_ThroughPut = m_PacketSize * 8 / (m_DelayTime / m_count) / 1024 / 1024;
NS_LOG_UNCOND("End of simulation (" << Simulator::Now().GetSeconds() << "s Number of
Vehicles: " << m_NumberOfVehicles << ")");
std::cout << "Throughput: " << m_ThroughPut << " Mbps" << std::endl;
std::cout << "Mean delay: " << m_DelayTime / m_count << " sec" << std::endl;
std::cout << "PDR: " << m_RxPackets * 100.0 / m_TxPackets << " %" << std::endl;
Simulator::Destroy();
return 0;
}
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